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NOTE 
ZONING FOR THE MENTALLY ILL: 
A LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 
DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN* 
Under the aegis of President John Kennedy, Congress first began to concern 
itse/fwith the needs of the mentally ill over two decades ago. Bills providingfor 
community mental health centers and congregate housing have appeared subse-
quently to attempt to expedite integration of the mentally ill into community 
life. 
These congressional mandates, however, have met with reluctance-if not 
hostility. While federal la.'UJW.(Jkers have been the champion of deinstitu-
tionalization, they have pla.ced responsibility for implementatiim of their pro-
grams on the state a.nd local levels. There, local governmental authorities have 
reacted defensively to exclude the mentally ill from their neighborhoods, 
primarily by exclusiona.ry zoning. 
In this Note, Ms. Schmedemann argues that state legislatures must endeavor 
to fu1Jill the broad mandates of deinstitutionalization set out by Congress. To 
that end, she proposes creation of statewide mental health agencies. Such pro-
grams, says Ms. Schmedemann, would not only assure federal financial 
assistance, but set up uniform land use patterns on the state level to avoid 
parochial local efforts to exclude group residences for the mentally ill. 
In 1963, President Kennedy proposed to Congress and the 
American people a new national goal: "We must act," he urged 
"(t)o retain. _ . and return to the community the mentally ill 
and mentally retarded,! [in order] to restore and revitalize their 
lives." 2 
* B.A., Stanford University, 1977; Member, Class of 1980, Harvard Law SchooI. 
1 This Note focuses on exclusionary zoning of group residences for the mentally ill. 
Because legislatures and courts often have addressed the needs of the mentally ill and 
mentally retarded (or developmentally disabled) in tandem, group residences for the 
mentally ill often are mentioned in passing. The reader should not assume, however, 
that the analysis and conclusions of this Note may be applied to group residences for the 
mentally retarded. Indeed, differences in the clinical characteristics of the two groups 
may well argue for differences in legal treatment. 
Also, this Note does not distinguish the mentally ill who have been institutionalized 
through civil commitment proceedings and those who have been adjudged criminally in-
sane. That distinction is more properly considered in an analysis of commitment 
statutes. 
For legal developments in the area of mental disability law in general, see MENTAL 
fl' DISABILITY LAW REPORTER (ABA). 
Finally, group residences are of course used in the rehabilitation of numerous 
groups-ex-offenders, ex-drug addicts, juvenile delinquents, etc. I do not pretend to 
analyze here the factual or legal issues raised by these different group residences, ex-
cept to the extent that all group residences face the same basic obstacles in the com-
munity and among lawmakers. 
2 President's Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, [1963] 
U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 1466 (Feb. 5, 1963). 
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Fifteen years later, the President's Commission on Mental 
Health reported that "ghettos" of the mentally disabled "de-
stroy the residential character of the affected neighborhoods 
and subvert the right of handicapped persons to live in normal 
residential surroundingS."8 
Why has so noble an effort - the integration of the mentally 
ill into community life - been so unsuccessful? Of key impor-
tance has been exclusionary zoning. Local zoning ordinances 
have been written or construed to prohibit the establishment of 
group residences for the mentally ill in many residential areas, 
relegating the mentally ill to a city's least desirable neigh-
borhoods or to life alone. Neither of these arrangements can be 
deemed restorative or revitalizing. 
This Note undertakes several tasks. Part I surveys the con-
flicting interests of the mentally ill and residential communities. 
Part II first describes the conflicting reactions to date by the 
nation's lawmakers-local, state, and federal - and then pro-
poses legislative solutions on the state level. Part III examines 
the contours of that solution, through a defense of its legal 
validity as a general matter, critical appraisal of existing legisla-
tion, and suggestions for future enactments. 
I. COMMUNITIES IN CONFLICT 
Judge David Bazelon has appropriately described the tensions 
affecting the movement to integrate the mentally ill into com-
munity life. Says Bazelon: 
On the one hand, we want to "protect ourselves" from these 
individuals and thereby end our discomfort. But, on the other 
hand, we want to protect them and ameliorate their suffer-
ing by helping and treating them. Too often the types of 
custody that make us feel more comfortable are not the best 
treatment or custody for these individuals.4 
The problems of the mentally ill are indeed often reduced to 
3 U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, VOLS. II-IV: ApPENDICES:TASKP ANEL 
REPORTS, Appendix Vol. IV at 1390 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK PANEL REPORTS]. 
4 Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 897 (1975). Bazelon was writing about the criminally insane: his 
assessment, however, is equally applicable to the mentally ill who have been civilly com· 
mit.ted. 
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an "us vs. them" situation, with the mentally ill and the mental-
ly stable depicted as two distinct camps. But the image is overly 
simplistic. Mental illness remains a common phenomenon6; a 
1977 federal report in fact maintains that ten percent of the 
American population is mentally ill.6 Nonetheless, it is useful 
for purposes of analysis to view the mentally ill and the general 
public as distinct groups with separate interests to be protected 
in any resolution of the exclusionary zoning dilemma. 
A. The Mentally Ill: Deinstitutionalization 
The movement to return the mentally ill to the mainstream of 
American life spurred by President Kennedy has been labeled 
"deinstitutionalization." A recent federal report has defined 
the term as "the process of (1) preventing both unnecessary ad-
mission to and retention in institutions, [and] (2) finding and 
developing appropriate alternatives in the community for hous-
ing, treatment, training, education and rehabilitation of the 
mentally disabled."7 The number of individuals immediately af-
fected by deinstitutionalization has been and will continue to be 
significant. From 1958 to 1973, the patient population of state 
mental hospitals decreased by more than 300,000 with most of 
the released patients re-entering community life; in 1975, ap-
proximately 300,000 more remained in institutional settings.s 
Contemporaneous medical advancements and shifts in treat-
ment philosophy have prompted the recent move for deinstitu-
tionalization within the psychiatric profession. During the 
1950's, psychotropic drugs, which mitigate the bizarre behavior 
5 Mechanic, Explanations of Mental Illness, 166 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 
381, 384 (1978). The origins of mental illness are unclear. Many psychiatrists view it as 
the capricious and unfortunate interaction of predispositional factors, social situation 
and personal history. For a general description of mental disorders, see Redlich & 
Kellert, Trends in American Mental Health, 135 AM. J. PSYCH. 22 (1978). 
6 COr-IF. GEN. REP. TO CONGRESS, RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE COM· 
MUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO Do MORE (Jan. 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as RETURNING 
THE MENTALLY DISABLED]. 
7 Id. 
8 S. REP. No. 94-198, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 469, 540 (1975). The precise figures are 570,000 in 1957 to 248,564 in 
1973. The Senate Report found that in 1975 over one "million persons resided in state 
mental hospitals and nursing homes, and that institutional care was inappropriate for 
between one-quarter and one-third of that number. 
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patterns associated with some forms of mental illness, were 
developed, making life in the community a feasible option for 
the first time for a large number of mental patients.9 Further-
more, psychiatrists became increasingly conscious of the 
debilitating impact of institutionalization itself.lO The logic of 
treating the mentally ill in the community therefore seemed 
clean and strong. As one writer notes: "[T]reatment and sup-
port in the community - precisely where the patient needs help 
in adjusting - appears as an appropriate direction to follow/'ll 
The components of an ideal system for integrating former 
mental hospital patients into the community are many and in-
terrelated: a rehabilitation program to build or restore the pa-
tient's employment skills, psychiatric care, social support serv-
ices and - of key importance - a residential placement in the 
community.12 Residential placements come in many forms, 
reflecting the differing needs and functional levels of patients. 
A highly independent patient may be able to live alone upon 
release from the institution, with a foster family, or with several 
other patients in a cooperative apartment setting.1S For the less 
independent patient, a more appropriate placement may be the 
"therapeutic community" of a group residence, where a small 
group of mentally ill persons live together as a "surrogate fami-
ly" under the guidance of live-in house staff.14 
9 RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 6, at 2. 
10 The seminal treatise is E. GoFFMAN,ASYLUMS(1961). See 0180 the texts of the right 
to treatment cases, notes 71 to 86 infra, The debilitating impact has been documented 
in e.g., Stein, Test & Marx, Alternatives to the Hospital: A Controlled Study, 132 AM. J. 
PSYCH. 517 (1975). 
11 Marx, Test & Stein, Extralwspital Management of Severe Mental Illness: 
Feasibility and Effects of Social Functioning, 29 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 505, 505 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Marx]. 
12 See H. LAMB, COMMUNITY SURVlV AL FOR LONG TERM PATIENTS (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as LAMB] for a more comprehensive description of a complete community·based 
mental health system. 
13 None of these residential placements is likely to encounter zoning obstacles. For a 
description of the cooperative apartment model, see Chien & Cole, Landlord-Supervised 
Cooperative Apartments: A New Modality for Community·Based Treatment, 130 AM. J. 
PSYCH. 156 (1973). 
14 A more complete description of a group residence is: 
The halfway house is essentially a therapeutic community with an environment 
that has been organized to maximize the therapeutic potential of all the com· 
ponents. These elements include the physical surroundings, the attitudes and 
behavior of staff, the resident-to-staff and resident-to-resident interactions, 
and all activities, including such routine tasks as preparing and eating meals 
and doing daily clean·up chores •••• 
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Over the years, group residences have constituted an integral 
and apparently successful link in systems aimed at integrating 
the mentally ill into community life. :Although it is difficult to 
quantify improvement in an individual's mental health, it does 
appear that placement in a group residence operates to the 
benefit of patients released from institutions.15 The relapse 
rates (frequency of readmission to the institution) for patients 
placed in group residences are believed to be no higher than and 
in some cases lower than those for patients released without 
such a placement.16 Studies further indicate that group 
residences are particularly successful in terms of how well pa-
tients fare in the community.u Finally, some psychiatrists have 
argued that, even absent such relatively quantifiable factors as 
reduced relapse rates and improved functioning, community life 
in a group residence is preferrable over life in an institution for 
the simple reason that it is more humanly satisfying.18 
[T]he residents are able to experiment with additional responsibility, learn 
and test new attitudes and behaviors, and develop constructive social relation-
ships. The staff play a nondirective, facilitative role, using appropriate role 
modeling and reinforcement and encouraging the residents' initiative. 
The therapeutic community approach is implemented primarily in two ways: 
first, in the informal, family-like relationship in the residents' house .•• and 
second, in the structured activities .•• 
Beigel, Hollenbach, et al., Practical Issues in Developing and Operating a Halfway 
HouseProgram, 28 Hosp. & CmlM. PSYCH. 601, 601 (1977). See also Jansen, The Role of 
the Halfway House in Community Mental Health Programs in the UnitedKingdom and 
America, 126 AM. J. PSYCH. 1498 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jansen]. 
For a description of a group residence from the perspective of the legal system, see 
Township of Wash. v. Central Bergen Community Mental Health Center, Inc., 156 N.J. 
Super. 388, 383 A.2d 1194 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Township of Washington]. 
15 This result assumes that the group residence conforms to the model of a group 
residence as a therapeutic community. Clearly, group residences which lack the 
necessary funding, community support, and neighborhood stability contemplated by the 
model are less likely to prove beneficial to their residents. 
16 For surveys of recent studies, see Bachrach, A Note on Some Recent Studies of 
Released Mental Patients in the Comm'Ilnity, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 73 (1976); Rog & 
Rausch, The Psychiatric Halfway House: How Is It Measuring Up?, 11 COMM. MENTAL 
HEALTH J. 155 (1975). 
17 E.g., Linn, Caffey, Klett & Hogarty, Hospital vs. Community (Foster) Carefor 
Psychiatric Patients, 34 ARcH. GEN. PSYCH. 78 (1977); Lamb & Goetzel, Discharged 
Mental Patients - Are They Really in the Community?, 24 ARcH. GEN. PSYCH. 29 
(1971). 
18 R. GLASSOOl'E, ET AL., HALFWAY HOUSES FOR THE MENTALLY lLL(Joint Information 
Service of the American Psychiatric Association and the National Association for Men-
tal Health 1971). 
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B. The MentaUy Stahle: Self-Protectionism 
As Judge Bazelon has noted, the attitude of the general public 
toward the mentally ill is ambivalent.19 In the abstract, most 
Americans are likely to be solicitous of the mentally ill and 
desirous of improving their plight. 20 Yet, when the issue 
becomes more immediate and concrete, i.e., when aiding the 
mentally ill entails admitting them into one's own community, 
altruism fades and self-protectionist attitudes emerge. Ex-
pressed and "unexpressed but patently recognizable"21 fears 
motivate communities to exclude group residences from within 
their borders. The fears may be real; but the grounds for them 
appear to be, for the most part, unrealistic. While a given com-
munity's concern no doubt is multifaceted and complex, it is 
useful for analytical purposes to examine two causes of this 
reluctance: resistance to the group residence and resistance to 
the residents. 
Legal challenges to group residences, regardless of the identi-
ty of the occupants, frequently claim that the residence's social 
and physical structure is incompatible with the character of the 
neighborhood. Reluctant neighbors view group residences as 
mini-institutions22 or as pseudo-correctional institutions.23 They 
cite with apprehension the overcrowding,24 disruption,26 and 
undermining of the neighborhood's family character26 which in 
19 See note 4 supra. 
20 At least, this has been one of the operating premises of much of the federallegisla-
tion supporting deinstitutionalization. See the legislative history of the federallegisla-
tion discussed in text accompanying notes 42 to 71 infra. 
21 Township of Washington, supra note 14, at 395. 
22 E.g., Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 34 A.2d 993 (1976) (multihandicapped children) 
[hereinafter cited as Berger]. Cj. Browndale International Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment 
for County of Dane, 60 Wisc. 2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 
(1974) (complex of six homes for emotionally disturbed children) [hereinafter cited as 
Browndale International]. 
23 E.g., State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1975) (male juvenile delin-
quents); Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (Utah 1974) (boys with mental or emotional prob-
lems). 
24 E.g., Y.W.C.A. of Summit v. Board of Adjustment, 134 N.J. Super. 384, 341 A.2d 
356 (1975), affd, 141 N.J. Super. 315, 358 A.2d 211 (1976) (twelve girls); City of 
Newark v. Johnson, 175 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1961) (state wards). 
25 E.g., Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Organization for Retarded 
Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1976) (mentally retarded children); Adams 
County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 580 P.2d 1246 (Colo. 
1978) (mentally retarded) [hereinafter cited as Adams County]. 
26 E.g., Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 563 P.2d 12 (Colo. 1977) (mentally retarded 
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their view inevitably attend a group residence. These apprehen-
sions, however, stem from a misconception of the structure and 
operations of a group residence. The very premise of a group 
residence is to serve its occupants by providing for them an in-
conspicuous, normal, family-like environment.27 As one state 
supreme court wrote of a group residence for the mentally 
retarded, group homes are "consonant with, not destructive of, 
the residential nature of the community."2s 
A second class of concerns, often unstated, derives from the 
attribute of the residents themselves - mental illness. It is 
almost a truism that the disturbed are disturbing to the sane.29 
A recent study exploring the reactions of landlords to potential 
tenants found that a background of mental illness results in a 
stigma comparable to that created by a prison record.80 In many 
cases, the uneasiness appears to stem not from an actual en-
counter with a mentally ill individual, but from an abstract 
stereotype, a stereotype which is usually disproven by actually 
meeting him.81 Although attitudes are becoming more accept-
ing,82 it appears that the uninformed public often imagines men-
tal illness only in its most acute forms; accordingly, providing 
information about the various types and magnitudes of mental 
illness may ease the fear. 33 
Eliminating preconceptions, however, is unlikely to prove 
easy. For some, the nebulous sense of discomfort produced by 
potential contact with the mentally ill stems from an ingrained 
children); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (neglected children) [hereinafter cited as City oj White Plains]. 
27 See note 14 supra. 
28 Adams County, supra note 25, at 1250. 
29 E.g., Fracchia, Sheppard, et aI., Public Perceptions ojEx-MentalPatients, 66 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 74 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fracchia]; Aviram & Segal, Exclusion of 
the Mentally fll: Reflections on an Old Problem in aNew Context, 29 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 
126 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Aviram]; Gove & Fain, The Stigma of Mental 
Hospitalization: An Attempt to Evaluate Its Consequences, 28 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 494 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Gove]. 
30 Page, Effects of the Mental Illness Label in.Attempts to Obtain Accommodation, 9 
CANADIAN J. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 85 (1977). 
31 Gove, supra note 29. 
32 Fracchia, supra note 29. 
33 Aviram, supra note 29. 
Uneasiness towards the mentally ill is analogous to racial discrimination in interesting 
ways. For a thought-provoking analysis of the legal implications of the similarity, see 
Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classij'tCation?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974). 
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belief that the mentally ill are more dangerous than the mental-
ly stable. For many, this conviction is based on nothing more 
than a belief that the mentally ill have a penchant for unpredict-
able behavior. Whether there is a correlation between mental 
illness and crime and violence (i.e., whether the mentally ill as a 
group are more prone than the general public to violence, given 
identical environments) remains an unanswered question.84 The 
American Psychiatric Association estimates that no more than 
ten percent of the hospitalized mentally ill qualify as 
"dangerous," 36 and presumably, the percentage would be 
significantly less among patients released to life in the com-
munity, since the ability to function well in the community is a 
primary prerequisite for that release.36 
Legal challenges to group residences also raise neighborhood 
property values as a distinct interest deserving protection.37 
Whether the monetary value of a piece of property is or should 
be legally cognizable standing alone is questionable.38 In this 
context, at least, the property interest of reluctant neighbors, if 
indeed imperiled by the establishment of a group residence, is 
threatened only because of the fears described above. Thus, to 
the extent those fears are unrealistic, the validity of concern 
with property value diminution is undermined. In fact, at least 
34 The difficulty in establishing or refuting the correlation lies in isolating the mental 
illness factor out of a very complex context. One study which did find a higher arrest 
rate for former mental patients (from Bellevue in New York City) than for the general 
public explained the results in part by citing the higher-than-average incidence of past 
criminal records among the patients studied and noted that "[t]he provision of suitable 
community facilities for treatment, supervision, or follow-up has not kept pace with the 
needs generated by the discharge of large numbers of mental hospital patients and by 
more restrictive admission policies." Zitrin, Hardesty, et al., Grime and Violence 
Among Menta}, Patients, 133 AM. J. PSYCH. 142, 147 (1976). For a survey of recent 
studies on the issue, see Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Menta}, Patients Recon-
sidered in View of the New Legal Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 
135 AM. J_ PSYCH. 33 (1978). 
35 A. STONE,MENTALHEALTHANDTHE LAW: A SYSTEM INTRANSlTION 27 (1976). 
36 See note 14 supra. 
37 E.g., Adams County, supra note 25; T01JJ1l8hip of Washington, supra note 14; 
Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc., 218 A.2d 383 (Conn. 1966) (parolees) 
[hereinafter cited as Nicholson]. 
38 Develnpments in the Law - Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1460-62 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Zoning]. 
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one study has found that property values remain undisturbed 
once a group residence has been established for the mentally 
ill.39 
* * * 
The drama underlying exclusionary zoning of group 
residences for the mentally ill thus is built upon a fundamental 
conflict between two communities. The interest of the mentally 
ill, clinically and on a societal level, is served when they are a 
part of the mainstream of American life. Yet many American 
communities more generally perceive it to be in their best in-
terest to exclude the mentally ill from their particular borders. 
One may well doubt, however, whether the perceptions of the 
general public are valid; indeed, at least some communities ac-
tually faced with accommodating group residences for the men-
tally ill have found themselves quite able and, ultimately, willing 
to do SO.40 As one psychiatric professional has observed, the 
establishment of a group residence in a community may well 
benefit the community by prompting it to "recognize its 
likeness to the disturbed rather than its unlikeness and take 
back some of the projections that isolated the patient and im-
poverished the community before."41 
II. GOVERNMENTS IN CONFLICT 
Tension between the mentally ill and the mentally stable 
residents of America's communities has been particularly evi-
dent in the legislative struggle over mental health laws. Broadly 
speaking, federal lawmakers have been the champions of 
deinstitutionalization, while local lawmakers, e.g., zoning 
authorities, generally have acted to exclude the mentally ill 
from their particular jurisdictions, in accordance with the 
desires of their limited and insular constituencies. Until recent-
39 THE SOCIAL IMPACl' OF GROUP HOMES: A STUDY OF SMALL RESIDENTIAL SERVICE 
PROGRAMS IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS, GREEN BAY PLANNING COMMISSION (1973), cited in 
LAl.m, supra note 12, at 52. 
40 Marx, supra note 11. 
41 Jansen, supra note 14, at 1498. 
42 For a more detailed description of federal activity furthering deinstitutionaliza-
tion through 1976, see RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 6. 
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ly, states have either abdicated their role or displayed more 
sympathy with local governments opposing integration than 
with the receptive stance of the federal government. 
A. Federal Law: Facilitating Deinstitutionalization 
The response of federal lawmakers to President Kennedy's 
1963 call for a national effort to return the mentally disabled to 
life in the community has been resounding and affirmative.42 In 
only 14 years, legislation and executive order~ had resulted in 
135 programs operated by eleven federal qepartments and 
agencies for the needs of the mentally ill, with an emphasis on 
life in the community. 43 At the same time, some segments of the 
federal judiciary have begun to formulate a legally cognizable 
"right" on the part of the mentally ill to certain forms of treat-
ment and self-determination, including integration into the 
community.44 
1. Legislation 
On the federal level, funding aimed at furthering deinstitu-
tionalization has come to provide a wide range of government 
services, commensurate with the range of the needs of the men-
tally ill. "Mentally disabled persons frequently have a variety of 
needs, including housing, income support, mental health and 
medical care, education, vocational training, employment and-
social services."45 
The foundation of federal deinstitutionalization efforts -
historically, conceptually and in terms of practical operations-
43 RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 6, at 5. The burden of providing 
for the various needs of the mentally ill in institutions remains for the most part on the 
states, the traditional primary providers of institutional care. For a description of the 
state/federal scheme of mental health care, see NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, Fl· 
NANCING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY AND ASSESSMENT OF 
ISSUES AND ARRANGEMENTS (1973) [hereinafter cited as FINANCING MENTAL HEALTH 
CARE]. 
Admittedly the course of federal activity here has been somewhat uneven, reflecting 
shifts in the nation's economic welfare and philosophical views. See the history of the 
Community Mental Health Centers legislation described in S. REP. No. 94-198, supra 
note 8. Throughout the past few decades, nonetheless, the direction of federallegisln· 
tion has been unswervingly pro-deinstitutionalizntion. 
44 See text accompanying notes 72 to 87 infra. 
45 RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 6, at 172. 
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is the community mental health centers network (CMHC). Con-
gress first authorized funds to aid states in the establishment of 
community mental health centers in 1963,46 and has amended 
the program several times since then to increase its appropria-
tions and expand the range of services offered by the centers.47 
In the CMHC legislation, Congress has emphasized the role of 
the community in mental health treatment not only by pro-
viding for treatment facilities which are oriented toward a 
specific community,48 but also by positing its major objective to 
"discourage the inappropriate placement of persons in inpatient 
facilities."49 Of particular importance to the group residence 
component of deinstitutionalization is the requirement that one 
of the services provided by a center be "a program of transi-
tional halfway house services."5o Appropriations for these pro-
grams for fiscal year 1980 total approximately $65 million. 51 
The CMHC program is augmented by Title XX, enacted in 
1975,52 a broad program that provides for federal reimburse-
ment of state expenditures directed at the goals of "achieving 
or maintaining self-sufficiency" and "prevellting or reducing 
inappropriate institutional care by providing for community-
based care, home-based care, or other forms of less intensive 
46 Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construc-
tion Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963). 
47 See Community Mental Health Centers Extension Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-622, 92 Stat. 3412 (1978), S. REP. No. 95-838, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978) reprinted 
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 9042, for a summary of the various changes. The 
legislation currently in effect is found at 42 U.S.C.A_ SS 2689 et seq. (1979 Supp.). 
48 The scheme of the legislation is to divide the nation into approximately 1500 
areas, each of which is to be served by its own CMHC. As of 1977,675 CMHCs have 
been funded, 592 of which were fully operational; forty-four percent of the American 
population was covered. S. REP. No. 95-838, supra note 47, at 9046. 
49 S. REP. No. 94-198, supra note 8, at 540. 
50 42 U.S.C.A. S 2689(bX1)(BXiv) (1970). This requirement becomes effective three 
years after the establishment of a new CMHC. As of the date of establishment, a CMHC 
must provide inpatient, emergency and outpatient services; screening assistance to 
courts and public agencies; follow-up care; consultation and education services. Three 
years later, the CMHC must provide, in addition to halfway houses, day care and partial 
hospitalization; services for children; services for the elderly; alcoholism and drug abuse 
programs (as needed). CMHCs not providing the second group of services initially must 
provide a plan for their phase-in within three years. 42 U.S.C.A. S 2689 (1970). 
51 42 U.S.C.A. SS 2689a-2689d (1970). 
The CMHC system's theory and operations have been examined critically in F. CHU & 
S. TROTl'ER, THE MADNESS ESTABLISHMENT: THE NADER REPORT (1974). 
52 Social Service Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, 42 
U.S.C.A. SS 1397(a) et seq. (1979 Supp.). 
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care."53 Reference to the list of services suggested for funding 
under Title XX "demonstrates the program's intent to address 
the daily needs of former mental patients in the community."54 
Those programs are comprehensive and cover "services 
for ... adults in foster care, day care services for adults, 
transportation services, training and related services, employ-
ment services, referral, and counseling"55 and others, to the ex-
clusion of medical care and residential expenses of institu-
tionalization in a mental hospital. 56 
Congress very recently has attempted to facilitate the 
establishment of group residences for the mentally ill in terms 
of housing legislation. Federal law for some time has provided 
housing support for the handicapped in the form of loans to 
public housing agencies and other developers. 57 In 1978, Con-
gress directly addressed the group residence model in the Con-
gregate Housing Services Act of 1978.68 The Act provides for 
contracts between the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and local housing agencies or nonprofit corpora-
tions for the provision of services "to promote and encourage 
maximum independence within a home environment for such 
residents capable of self-care with appropriate supportive con-
gregate services."59 The statement of Congressional findings 
prefatory to the legislation evinces the strong commitment of 
Congress to group residence programs: 
[C]ongregate housing, coordinated with the delivery of sup-
portive services, offers an innovative, proven, and cost-
effective means of enabling temporarily disabled or han-
dicapped individuals to maintain their dignity and in-
dependence and to avoid costly and unnecessary institu-
tionalization.6o 
53 42 U.S.C.A. S 1397a(aX1) (1975). 
54 See also the federal support of state vocational rehabilitation programs, 29 
U.S.C.A. SS 701 et seq. (1979 Supp.). 
55 lei. 
56 42 U.S.C.A. S 1397a(aX7Xe), 42 U.S.C.A. S 1397a(aXll) (1970). 
57 12 U.S.C.A. 1701q (1970 Supp.). Until 1974, only physically handicapped persons 
were covered by this program; Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 669 (1974), deleted that limitation. 
58 Pub. L. 95-557, 92 Stat. 2104, 42 U.S.C.A. SS 8001 et seq. (1978). 
59 42 U.S.C.A. S 8003 (1978). 
60 42 U.S.C.A. S 8001. For further elaboration, see the legislative history reprinted 
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4773. 
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Not all federal funding of community housing for the mentally 
ill, however, disburses funds via state and local providers. The 
major program channeling financial support directly to in-
dividual former mental hospital patients is Supplemental 
Security Income.61 Although SSI benefits, which are in essence 
subsistence payments,62 generally are available only at a re-
duced level or not at all to persons residing in treatment 
facilities,63 patients living in "publicly operated community 
residence[s] which [serve] no more than 16 residents" are eligi-
ble for full benefits under the program.64 The SSI payment 
scheme thus evinces an assessment by federal legislators that 
group residences are distinguishable in salient ways from other 
treatment facilities and that group residences are a valuable 
mechanism for treatment of the mentally ill. 
Federal funding operates to induce states to establish group 
residences as one component of a community-based mental 
health system. Under the federal system,65 grants are pred-
icated on the state's efforts in the community mental health 
sphere. Thus, for example, a state plan "to eliminate inap-
propriate placement in institutions of persons with mental 
health problems [and] to insure the availability of appropriate 
noninstitutional services"66 is a prerequisite to the receipt of 
health care revenue sharing monies in general. Similarly, ap-
plications by local agencies for federal aid for community 
development must include state housing plans that survey and 
assess the housing stock and needs of the handicapped.67 
Complementing the funding legislation described above is 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.68 Section 504 con-
stitutes a limited civil rights act for the handicapped: 
61 42 U.S.C.A. S 1381 et seq. (1979 Supp.). 
62 42 U.S.C.A. S 1382(b). 
63 42 U.S.C.A. S 1382(eX1XA), (B). 
64 42 U.S.C.A. S 1382(eX1XC). 
65 The benefits for the mentally ill being treated in the community imder Medicare 
and Medicaid are fairly limited: Medicare payments are limited to the lesser of $312.50 
or 61/2% of the patient's annual outpatient expenses. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13951 (1979 Supp.). 
And Medicaid requirements vary according to the patient's age, as well as type of treat-
ment facility and administering state. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395(1) (1979 Supp.). 
66 42 U.S.C.A. S 246(dX2XDXi)(I) (1978 Supp.). 
67 42 U.S.C.A. S 5304(aX4) (1979 Supp.). 
68 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 393, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2982, 
29 U.S.C.A. SS 793, 794 (1979 Supp.). 
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No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United 
States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance. . .69 
An individual qualifies for the protection of the provision if he 
actually has, or is perceived as having, "a physical or mental im-
pairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person's major life activities."7o Although the magnitude of 
Section 504's impact is yet to be measured or defined,71 the 
tenor of its mandate is unmistakable: absent compelling cause, 
the handicapped - including the mentally ill - are not to be 
treated differently than the general public. 
2. Judicial Action 
An important development in mental disability law during the 
deinstitutionalization era has been the success of mentally ill 
plaintiffs challenging the fact or conditions of their treatment in 
state mental health systems.72 In terms of the group residence 
69 29 U.S.C.A. § 794. 
70 29 U.S.C.A. § 706. 
The implementation regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
further define "mental impairment" as "any mental or psychological disorder, such as 
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific 
learning disabilities." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3. 
71 The practical impact of Section 504 likely will depend on the stringency of the 
regulations set forth by the various agencies and on.the sanctions applied in cases of 
noncompliance. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's regulations, 45 
C.F.R. Part 85,43 C.F.R. § 213.2 (Jan. 13, 1978) are to serve as th~ model for the other 
agencies. See Note, Ending Discrimination Against the Handicapped or Creating New 
Problems? The HEW Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1978, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399 (1978). The most immediately ef· 
fective enforcement mechanism likely will be termination of federal support, as pro-
vided for in Exec. Order No. 1194,41 Fed. Reg. 17871 (Apr. 28,1976). 
The primary legal issue is the role of the courts in effectuating the broad language of 
Section 504, e.g., does it imply a private cause of action? Maya court review de novo the 
determination of an administrative agency? E.g., Doe v. Colautti,,454 F. Supp. 621 (D. 
Pa. 1978) (the court assumes without deciding that Section 504 cr~ates a private cause 
of action, and still finds no unlawful discrimination in a state mfedical insurance plan 
which differentiates between general and psychiatric hospital care); NAACP v. Wilm· 
ington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978) (court refuses a trial de 
novo, limiting its role to a review of the administrative agency's findings by the tradi· 
tional criteria; HEW had found a violation of Section 504 in the defendant's plan to 
move its facilities from the inner city to the suburbs and had negotiated a compliance 
plan which the court found adequate). 
72 See generally the decisions noted in MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER, note 1 
supra. 
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movement, such litigation has produced far-reaching results by 
way of both legal theory - i. e., the construction by certain ac-
tivist judges of the "rights" of the mentally disabled to treat-
ment - and judicial mandates on state mental health systems to 
provide residential treatment services.73 Whether the analytical 
basis of these decisions is sound as a matter of law remains an 
open question74 (and beyond the scope of this essay); yet their 
practical impact remains strong. 
Three suits spanning the 1970s constitute the clearest suc-
cesses by the mentally ill to secure judicial action resulting in 
the provision of adequate group residence services.75 In the 
1971 landmark case of Wyatt v. Stickney,76 Judge Frank 
Johnson found a violation of due process in Alabama's practice 
of confining mentally retarded and mentally ill persons for 
therapeutic reasons in state institutions when no adequate 
treatment was provided.77 He ordered and subsequently 
monitored a program of extensive reform.78 Several years later, 
the residents of Washington, D.C.'s St. Elizabeth's Hospital 
brought suit alleging unlawful failure on the part of the District 
to provide adequate community residential services.79 In Dixon 
73 See text accompanying notes 75 to 87 infra. A systematic discussion of the evolu-
tion of these rights is provided in NAT'L Assoc. OF ATl"YS GEN., THE RIGHT TO TREAT-
MENT IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW (February 1976). 
74 The main ground for doubt is O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 85 to 87 infra. Legal scholars seem to be more favor-
ably disposed towards the development than is the Supreme Court. According to TASK 
PANEL REPORTS, supra note 3, at 1422, at least fifty law review articles have been 
written on the subject, most concurring \vith the activist courts as a matter of law or 
policy. A fairly comprehensive analysis is found in a law review symposium in 62 U. CAL 
- BERKELEY L. REV. 617 (1974). 
75 For parallel developments regarding the mentally retarded, see Evans v. 
Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978); Halderman v. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. 
1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977) and 451 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (extensive discussion of the 
rights to treatment and habilitation); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. 
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
76 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
77 [d. at 785. 
78 [d. at 785-86. For subsequent opinions attemptiI).g to implement the reform, see 
Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 
1972); affd. sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
79 The District of Columbia has spawned a long series of important cases in the right 
to treatment area; read together they provide insight into the evolution of the right. 
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (petition for habeas corpus by an in-
digent senile patient committed as insane; held the District's mental health code con-
ferred a right to have alternatives to the institution evaluated); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (petition for habeas corpus by criminal defendant acquitted by 
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v. Weinberger,80 the D.C. district court agreed with the plain-
tiffs, relying on the District's mental health code,81 and, after 
noting that "housing ... is integrally related to 'treatment,' "82 
ordered the District's social services agencies and the hospital 
to provide the missing services under the court's continued 
supervision.83 More recently, a federal district court in 
Massachusetts approved a consent decree in the case of 
Brewster v. Dukakis,84 which requires the state's department of 
mental health to provide an adequate community residence net-
work for patients served by one of the state's mental hospitals. 
The Supreme Court has been much more conservative than 
the lower federal courts in its examination of the interests of 
the mentally ill in community life. Thus far, it has refused to 
validate the theory asserted by the lower courts that the men-
tally ill have a right to treatment generally, much less a right to 
treatment in the least restrictive alternative.85 When presented 
with the opportunity to do so in 0 'Connor v. Donaldson,86 the 
Court opted for a holding based on the liberty interest, stating, 
"a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-
dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in 
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible 
reason of insanity; held the defendant held a statutory right to treatment); Covington v. 
Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 196.9) (petition for habeas corpus by patient in the 
hospital's maximum security ward; held that the principle of the least restrictive alter-
native applies to the choice of treatment modes within an institution). 
80 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975). 
81 D.C. CODE ANN. S 21-562 (1973): "A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a 
mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric 
care and treatment." 
82 405 F. Supp. at 979. 
831d. 
84 D. Mass., Ct. No. 76-4423, filed Dec. 15, 1976. Among the grounds alleged by the 
plaintiffs are Massachusetts law, the federal legislation described in text accompanying 
notes 45 to 70 supra, and the first, eighth, ninth and fourteenth amendments. 
85 Chief Justice Burger expressly suggests that the right to treatment theory suffers 
from serious flaws in his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra note 74. 
See note 86 infra. 
86 422 U.S. 563. The case concerned a patient who had been civilly committed and 
kept involuntariIy in a state mental institution for fifteen years without treatment. The 
Court could have viewed the case as a rigpt to treatment case or as a test of civil com-
mitment standards; it seems to have chosen the latter approach. For a survey of the 
states' civil commitment standards as of 1974, see Deve7hpments in the Law - Civil 
Commitment afthe Mentally lU, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190 (1974); for updates, see MENTAL 
DISABILITY LAw REPORTER, note 1 supra. 
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family members or friends."87 Although the language clearly 
stopped short of recognizing a constitutional right, it at least 
appeared to contemplate a place in the community for the men-
tally ill. 
* * * 
In general, then, the deinstitutionalization movement has 
garnered considerable support among federal lawmakers. 
Although it is untenable to assert that the place of the mentally 
ill in the community is constitutionally protected, some 
segments of the federal judiciary have recognized an entitle-
ment on the part of the mentally ill to adequate treatment in the 
community. More important perhaps in practical terms, Con-
gress has exercised its powerful funding incentive to prompt 
states to provide group residence services for their mentally ill 
citizens. 
B. Local Law: Exclusionary Zoning 
As federal legislation and judicial activism have attempted to 
facilitate integration of the mentally ill into community life, 
local government authorities have reacted defensively to ex-
clude the mentally ill from their neighborhoods. The primary 
defense mechanism has been exclusionary zoning of group 
residences for the mentally ill.88 
The zoning power of local governments generally derives 
87 422 U.S. at 576. 
88 At least, exclusionary zoning has given rise to the most litigation in the field. For 
an example of an alternative method of exclusion, see Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (successful challenge to a local ordinance barring registration of per-
sons requiring continuous medical or psychiatric services in boarding houses). Private 
citizens may also use legal mechanisms to exclude group residences; see Seaton v. Clif-
ford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App. 2d Div. 1972) (restrictive 
covenants may prohibit the establishment of a group residence) [hereinafter cited as 
Seaton]; City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., 322 
So .. 2d 571 (Ct. App. Fla. 1975), on remand, 332 So. 2d 610 (1976) (zoning and nuisance 
challenge to home for mentally retarded) [hereinafter cited as Hillsborough]; Nicholson, 
supra note 37 (unsuccessful nuisance suit against a home for parolees). 
For the perspective of mental health professionals on zoning as only the latest in a 
long line of methods of excluding the mentally ill from community life, see Aviram, 
supra note 29; Cupaiolo, Community Residences and Zoning Ordinances, 28 Hosp. AND 
COMM. PSYCH. 206 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Cupaiolo]. 
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from state zoning enabling acts:89 these acts delegate a measure 
of the state's police power to municipalities in order to promote 
the "health, safety, ... [or] general welfare of the com-
munity"90 through property use planning and regulation. Zon-
ing affords local governments considerable latitude in 
regulating (or prohibiting) the establishment of group 
residences for the mentally ill, in part because the permissible 
purposes of zoning ordinances are phrased in very broad terms 
by statute,91 and in part because the standards for judicial 
review of zoning ordinances and their operation are less than 
rigorous.92 
Often communities have used this latitude93 to exclude group 
residences for the mentally ill from those areas, e.g., single 
family residential districts, most appropriate to their purposes 
and operation.94 Methods of exclusion range from the blatant to 
89 Every state has a zoning enabling act; alternative sources of the power to zone are 
state constitutions and home rule charters. Even when the latter exist, the enabling act 
is looked to in defining the scope of local authority. V. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE 
CONTROLS §§ 32.02-.05, 35.03-.05 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN]. 
90 U.S. DEP'T. OF CoMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, S. 1 (1926). 
(The model statute is the basis for most state zoning enabling acts.) 
91 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act lists the following as permissible objec-
tives: to lessen congestion; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to pro-
mote the health and general welfare of the community; to provide adequate light and 
air; to prevent overcrowding of land and undue concentrations of people; to facilitate 
the adequate provision of public services such as transportatlpn, water, sewage, 
schools, parks. [d. For descriptions of how these objectives have been construed, see 
RoHAN, supra note 89, §§ 34.01-43.03; Develrrpments - Zoning, supra note 38, at 
1443-62. 
92 In an early case approving the mechanism of zoning in general, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth the constitutional standard applicable to zoning ordinances: 
that they not be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
RoHAN, supra note 89, at S. 36.05, defines the scope of judicial review here as "limited 
to a determination whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the 
zoning authorities. If the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly debatable, the ad· 
ministrative action will not be disturbed. A court will interfere only where the or-
dinance, either in its language or application, is clearly arbitrary or unreasonable, or 
where it violates due process or equal protection guarantees. The courts will also review 
governmental action that involves alleged abuses of discretion or overuse of power or 
errors of law. The meaning of certain words or terms in zoning questions is a question of 
law for the courts. Moreover, courts must construe statutes in such a way as not to 
deprive persons of important rights, and to avoid an unconstitutional or irrational 
result." 
93 Not all communities are afforded complete free rein here; see text accompanying 
notes 109 to 132, 148, 182 to 199 infra. 
94 See note 14 supra. 
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the sophisticated. Paradigmatic of the former is an ordinance of 
Boston, Massachusetts, which expressly designates halfway 
houses for the mentally ill as forbidden uses in most residential 
districts.96 Probably more typical are ordinances which prohibit 
group residences by defining "family" (as in "single family 
residential") to exclude the social unit composed of a group of 
unrelated mentally ill adults and their house staff.96 For exam-
ple, an ordinance of White Plains, New York, defines a family 
as an individual plus his or her spouse, children, parents or 
other specified relatives living together as a single housekeep-
ing unit.97 A third, procedural, technique which may operate to 
exclude an undesired group residence from a neighborhood 
often overlays the other methods. Group residences may be 
allowed as a special use if they qualify for a special use permit, 
the requisites of which are within the discretion of local zoning 
administrators (who, sensitive to local pressures, may well im-
pose prohibitively stringent requirements).98 Whether the 
method of exclusion is intentional or fortuitous,99 apparent on 
the face of the ordinance or only as applied, the result is the 
same - an effective barrier to group residences. 
c. lnefficatYJJ of Judicia,l Action a,nd 
the Need for State Legisla,tion 
The burden of reconciling the federal government's directive 
to deinstitutionalize the mentally ill and the local governments' 
practice of exclusionary zoning rests with the states. Not only 
do the states occupy the middle ground between the federal and 
local governments, they also constitute the major provider of 
95 Boston Zoning Code, Use Item No. 23. 
96 For a more detailed description of the various types of family definitions and an 
analysis of their applications to group residences, see Wildgen, Exclusionary Zoning 
and Its Effects on Group HQTMS in Areas Zonedfor Single-Family Dwellings, 24 KAN-
SAS L. REV. 677 (1976). 
97 Cited in City of White Plains, supra note 26. 
98 For descriptions of how the special use permit may be used to block the establish-
ment of an undesired facility in an area, see A viram, supra note 29; Mile Square Service 
Corp. v. City of Chicago Zoning 'Ed. of Appeals, 42 m. App. 3d 849, 356 N.E.2d 871 
(1976) (judicial affirmance of a refusal of a special use permit for a drug addiction treat-
ment center). 
99 Cupaiolo, supra note 88, depicts exclusionary zoning practices as an unfortunate 
happenstance rather than a conscious effort. 
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mental health care, traditionally and as contemplated under 
federal programs.100 Further, it is unlikely that either the local 
or federal government will act to effectuate the needed com-
promise. Absent pressure from above, local governments are 
unlikely to ease zoning restrictions of their own accord.101 And 
zoning in general has long been regarded as the almost ex-
clusive province of the state and local governments,102 thus 
precluding preemptive federal action. 
The few federal zoning cases decided during the past decade, 
several of which bear indirectly on exclusionary zoning of group 
residences for the mentally ill, affirm the fact that state and 
local governments are responsible for arranging land use 
systems to accommodate different communities. The Supreme 
Court has refused to entertain federal equal protection 
challenges to zoning on the grounds of de facto racial 
discrimination;103 it has also denied certiorari in a case where 
the state court held that developing communities are obligated 
to provide a fair share of the region's low income housing.l04 
Furthermore, the Court's scrutiny of definitions of "family" as 
used in zoning ordinances has resulted in invalidation only in 
the clear case where the definition penetrated the traditional, 
100 See text accompanying notes 43 and 46 to 60 supra. 
101 A specific community is unlikely to perceive any benefits to it or its citizens by 
easing its exclusionary zoning practices, since the funding incentives tend to be chan-
neled to or through the states and the narrow visions of community members may 
obscure the less tangible benefit of increased understanding of mental illness. 
102 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was developed as a model for - not as 
a mandate upon - state governments. Developments - Zoning, supra note 38, at 1435. 
And in Euclid, supra note 92, zoning earned constitutional approval as "some aspect of 
the police power" - in the province of the states. 272 U.S. at 387. The involvement of 
the federal government in zoning per se has been minimal since zoning's inception. See 
Developments - Zoning, supra note 38. 
lt is of course overly simplistic to assume that the federal government does not in· 
fluence loca1land use decisions in any way: federal funding incentives and contracts 
reach land use indirectly, as this subject exemplifies. See Freilich, Awakening the Sleep-
ing Giant: New Trends and Developments in Environmental and Land-Use Controls, 
published in 1974 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1-3 (1974) 
(Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas). 
103 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977) (plaintiffs had not proved discriminatory intent); Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiffs lacked standing in the absence of a personal and immediate 
injury). 
104 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 
336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) [hereinafter cited asMt. Laurel]. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Harv. J. on Legis. 873 1979
1979] Zoning 873 
nuclear family unit,105 while a less egregiously restrictive defini-
tion (excluding a group of college students) has been ap-
proved.10G Thus, regardless of whatever else these cases may be 
read to say,l°7 one may safely assume that the federal judiciary 
is not ready or willing to engage in local land use planning. 
In approving zoning as a general matter, the Supreme Court 
over fifty years ago realized that the zoning power of local 
governments could not be limitless, for there would be "cases 
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the in-
terest of the municipality that the municipality would not be 
allowed to stand in the way."10S Some state judiciaries have 
come to recognize that exclusionary zoning of group residences 
in general presents such a case; yet it is not clear that these 
decisions provide adequate precedent for the mentally ill. Fur-
thermore, whether courts acting alone are competent to effect 
the necessary changes in state zoning law is doubtful. State-
level legislation thus emerges as the most satisfactory method 
of resolving the conflicts among communities and governments 
inherent in this exclusionary zoning dilemma. 
1. The Inadequacy of State Case Law 
Persons desiring to provide community residential services 
for various client groups roughly analogous to the mentally ill, 
105 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (the ordinance had 
resulted in a jail sentence for a woman who lived with her son and two grandsons, who 
were first cousins). 
106 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The end of the zoning or-
dinance legitimated by the Court was assuring "family values, youth values, and the 
blessings of quiet seclusion." 416 U.S. at 9. 
107 See In State ex rel. Thelen v. City of Missoula, 543 P.2d 173 (Mont. 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Thelen]. In upholding a state law preempting local exclusionary 
zoning of group residences, the Supreme Court of Montana read Belle Terre, supra note 
106, to place the issue of exclusionary zoning in the province oflegislatures, rather than 
the judiciary and thus as consistent with the legislation under discussion. 
More broadly, these cases together may be read so as to cast doubts on exclusionary 
zoning of group residences for the mentally ill. That is, the Court has tacitly affirmed, 
or at least not refuted, the use of zoning to integrate communities. And the Court has 
recognized the validity of state definitions of "family," so that state legislation which 
would define and protect a group of mentally ill persons as a family would seem to be 
valid. An in-depth analysis of these cases clearly is beyond the scope of this note. See 
Developments - Zoning, supra note 38. 
108 Euclid, supra note 92, at 390. 
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e.g., the mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed children,109 
have achieved significant successes in state court challenges to 
exclusionary zoning.110 Yet, in terms of eradicating exclu-
sionary zoning of those group residences, these successes large-
ly are symbolic rather than sources of sound legal precedents. 
The rationales of these cases almost uniformly are unper-
suasive111 when applied to group residences for the mentally ill. 
Perhaps the most typical ground for judicial overrule of exclu-
sionary zoning (in keeping with the zoning mechanism most 
often used to attempt exclusion112) is a liberal construction of 
the term "family" as used in zoning ordinances. Thus, courts 
have found that, even though a group composed of two 
houseparents and up to ten unrelated mentally retarded or 
neglected children would not come within the words of a zoning 
ordinance's restrictive definition, it would nonetheless qualify 
from "outward appearances" to be "a relatively normal, stable 
arid permanent family unit, with which the community is prop-
erly concerned."113 When the outward resemblance to a tradi-
109 This analysis does not encompass judicial treatment of group residences for . 
other client groups, such as parolees, in any comprehensive fashion. Nor does it pretend 
to encompass all of the cases brought on behalf of the mentally retarded or emotionally 
disturbed. 
110 Litigation results and strategies in the area of exclusionary zoning of group 
residences have been analyzed in Levey, Comment, Municipal Corporatians - Zoning, 
7 FORDHAMURB. L. J. 203 (1978); Wildgen, supra note 96; Comment, Exclusion of Com-
munity Facilities for Offenders and Mentally Disabled Persans: Questians of Zoning, 
Home Rule, Nuisance and Canstitutional Law, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 918 (1976); Kressel, 
The ClYmmunity Residence MIYVement: Land Use Conflicts and Zoning Imperatives, 5 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137 (1975); Hong, Exclusion of the Mentally Handicap-
ped: Housing the Nontraditional Family, 7 U. CAL.-DAVISL. REV. 150 (1974). 
111 There have been a few successes in litigation concerning group residences for the 
mentally ill; either the results were straightforward or the reasoning strained. 
Tmunship of Washington, note 14 supra, (group residence: treating five former mental 
patients qualifies as a family within the broad definition of a single housekeeping unit); 
Ganim v. Village of New York Mills, 75 Misc. 2d 653, 347 N.Y.S.2d372 (Sup. Ct. 1973) 
(a boarding house for the mentally ill is comparable to a boarding house in general for 
zoning purposes); Zarek v. Attleboro Human Services, No. 2450 (Bristol Sup. Ct. Mass. 
June 11, 1976) (home for 12 to 15 mental patients qualifies as an educational use, broad· 
ly defined, in light of the Massachusetts policy of normalization of the mentally ill). 
112 See text accompanying notes 96 to 97 supra. 
113 City of White Plains, supra note 26. Other cases relying at least in part on this 
rationale include Hesslingv. City of Broomfield, supra note 26, State ex rel. Ellis v. Lid· 
dle, supra note 23, and the progeny of City of White Plains: Committee for the ~etter. 
ment of Mount Kisco v. Taylor, 63 A.D.2d 650,404 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1978) (ten childr~n); 
Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Ass'n for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 MISC. 
2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (eight mentally retarded young women): 
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tional family fades, the force of this justification for affording 
favorable zoning to a group residence dissipates.1l4 Clearly, a 
group composed of two houseparents and six mentally ill adults 
scarcely resembles "a relatively normal ... family unit."1l5 
Those seeking authorization for a group 'residence have also 
succeeded by arguing that the proposed home qualifies either 
for exemption according to state law or for favorable treatment 
according to local ordinance because of its educational use.1l6 
This approach requires depicting the group residence as a 
school1l7 or asserting that it l?erves a school or educational pur-
pose.llS Both arguments succeed most smoothly when the home 
is in fact linked to the public school system1l9 or when state law 
defines these terms broadly.120 Applying this rationale to 
facilities housing adults who do not require continued education 
tends to strain the theory beyond its limits of credibility .121 
A third rationale for invalidating restrictive zoning provisions 
rests on state-wide policy grounds. To block a residence by 
operation of a local zoning ordinance, so the argument goes, 
Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v: Bd. of Zoning and Appeals of the Town of 
North Hempstead, 82 Misc. 2d 634, 370 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (seven foster 
children); Moore v. Nowakowski, 46 A.D.2d 996, 361 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1975) (ten 
juveniles). . 
114 This may be true even where the client group is composed of children. E.g., 
Browndale International, supra note 22; Culp v. City of Seattle, 22 Wash. App. 618, 
590 P.2d 1288 (Ct. App. 1979). 
115 E.g., People v. Renaissance Project, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 65, 364 N.Y.S.2d 885, 324 
N.E.2d 335 (1975) (narclitics rehabilitation residence with five to twelve clients does not 
constitute a single housekeeping unit). A rare decision finding a group of adults to con-
stitute a family unit is Oliver v. Zoning Comm. of Town of Chester, 31 Conn. Sup. 197, 
326 A.2d 841 (C.P. 1974) (eight mentally retarded residents constitute a single 
housekeeping unit; the facility had been a nursing home previously). 
116 See Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 1087 (1975). 
117 E.g., Crist v. Bishop, supra note 23. 
118 E.g., Harbor Schools, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals of Haverhill, 366 N.E.2d 764 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1977) (emotionally disturbed girls) [hereinafter cited as Harbor Schools]; Arm-
strong v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Washington, 158 Conn. 158, 257 A.2d 799 
(1969) (mentally disturbed, but not mentally ill, children). 
119 E.g., Harbor Schools, supra note 118; In re Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. 
Hill, 11 N.Y.2d 182, 182 N.E.2d 268 (1968) (six dormitories for delinquent children 
linked to public school system). 
120 The definition relied upon in Zarek, supra note 111, is "the process of developing 
and training the powers and capabilities of human beings .... Education may be par-
ticularly directed to either the mental, moral, or physical powers and facilities, but in its 
broadest and best sense it relates to them all." 
121 For a good try, see Zarek, id. The holding relies heavily on the state's broad 
definition of education. 
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would thwart the state policy favoring community care and 
treatment of the state's troubled or disadvantaged citizens.122 
Variations on the theme assign the group residence sovereign 
immunity from zoning as a governmental entity,12S bring it 
within the exemptions afforded government agencies,124 or rely 
on vague notions of preemption.126 At first glance, this argu-
ment would appear to encompass group residences for the men-
tally ill as well as any other group residence, assuming the ex-
pression in state law of the requisite policy.126 Yet the approach 
is highly problematic. Absent a clear legislative directive, there 
is nothing in a state policy favoring community treatment or 
care that inherently or logically overrules the state policy of 
local control of land use.127 Thus, the state policy argument has 
prevailed primarily in three situations: in situations buttressing 
results based on the other two rationales,128 in safe situations 
(e.g., permitting the continuation of a nonconforming use),129 
and in situations where the two state policies have been ranked 
expressly by the legislature with residential care prevailing 
over local control of land use1SO (by no means the prevalent pat-
tern). 131 
Thus, while it may be tenable to portray case law in the broad 
area of exclusionary zoning as more sympathetic to providers 
and residents than to hesitant neighbors, the case law is 
122 E.g., Abbott House v. Village of Tarrytown, 34 A.D.2d 821, ~12 N.Y.S.2d 841 
(1970) (six neglected children). 
123 E.g., Hillsborough, note 88 supra. 
124 E.g., Town of Southern Pines v. Mohr, 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 865 (1976) 
(children's center). 
125 E.g., Nowack v. Dep't of Audit and Control, 72 Misc. 518, 338 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. 
Ct. Special Term 1973) (youth center). 
126 The use of this argument in successful zoning cases brought on behalf of the men-
tally ill is interesting: In Township ofWashingtcm, supra note 14, the court cited state 
policy but found no grounds to subordinate local zoning authority to it. The argument 
carried more weight in Ganim and Zarek, supra note 111. 
127 See note 126 supra; see also City of Newark v. Johnson, surrra note 24. 
128 E.g., Ellis, supra note 23, and Harbor Schools, supra note 118. 
129 Ganim, supra note 111. The facilities which benefitted fron? the success of the 
cases cited in notes 122 to 125 and note 128, for whatever reasons, are viewed as less 
troublesome within the law. 
130 Cases construing the state legislation discussed here which use that legislation as 
the grounds for a state policy argument are discussed in text accompanying notes 158 
to 168 infra. 
131 See text accompanying note 148 infra. 
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ultimately insufficient. It is a substantial leap from ordering a 
community to admit a home for the mentally retarded or 
children, to orderering a community to allow a facility housing 
mentally ill adults.132 Thus far, case law has not provided the 
analytical support for taking that leap. 
2. The Inadequacy of Judicial Resolutions 
Even if case law provided adequate precedent for judicial 
overrule of exclusionary zoning of the mentally ill, it would be 
unwise to rely on the judiciary as the agent of reform.133 The 
often tortuous course of a lawsuit, even a successful one, 
underlines some of the weaknesses of judicial resolution in this 
context. 
To start, judge-made law arises only when instigated by an 
appropriate case.134 Whether such a case will arise in a given 
state depends on fortuity and the relative resources and 
degrees of commitment of the litigants,135 rather than on the 
legal system's need for the litigation. Thus, the proper case may 
never reach the judiciary's consideration if, for example, the 
prospective provider of the group residence is too poor to pur-
sue costly litigation, the prospective provider never finds an 
economically feasible site, or a local zoning authority proves 
sympathetic and allows the group residence. There is no reason 
to assume that the litigant with the most convincing and 
representative case will be the litigant who makes it to court. 
Assuming the appropriate case is indeed presented, it is still 
132 At least, the special fears of mental illness held by the American public, see notes 
29 to 36 supra, may cause a court to think twice before extending what precedent there 
is to homes for the mentally ill. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 115, where the court 
specifically distinguishes the mentally retarded from the mentally ill. 
133 For a more complete analysis of the inefficacy of courts in the area of exclu-
sionary zoning generally, see, Note, The lnadef[lUJCY of Judicial Remedies in Cases of 
Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REV. 760 (1976). 
134 At the least, judge-made law must be predicated on a case presenting an ap-
propriate fact situation to be minimally defensible. 
135 Should there be a disparity in resources between the litigants here, it likely 
would work to the disadvantage of the residence providers. One may assume that the 
providers of group residence programs are not likely to be wealthy individuals or 
organizations. Resistant members of a community or their local government are more 
likely to be sufficiently funded to pursue litigation. See Cupaiolo, supra note 88, for a 
social worker's assessment of the eXpense, in time and money, of litigating in exclu-
sionary zoning challenges. 
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problematic whether the court can fashion a holding of the req-
uisite scope without exceeding its legitimate role. In the first in-
stance, courts reviewing zoning decisions are bound by a fairly 
narrow scope of review136; to invalidate a local zoning ordinance 
as applied or on its face thus could well be construed as 
overstepping. Equally problematic is the issue of how far-
reaching the decision should be, given that the typical court 
challenge to exclusionary zoning involves only one residence 
and one community.131 Assuming the case reaches a court with 
a statewide jurisdiction,138 its outcome will be restricted to the 
facts of the case in controversy (e.g., establishment of the par-
ticular group residence in issue or invalidation of the challenged 
ordinance) potentially resulting in a patchwork pattern of 
restrictive and open areas. Such a pattern in turn would pro-
duce an undesirable clustering of group residences.139 On the 
other hand, to use the litigated case as a springboard for a state-
wide rule may seem imprudent in an area where local 
peculiarities are factually crucial and highly valued. 
Technical questions arise as well in the process of fashioning 
an appropriate holding. The multiplicity of exclusionary zoning 
mechanisms140 means that a decision which would address the 
ordinance of one community would pass over those of other 
areas. For example, a judicial redefinition of "family" would 
not ameliorate exclusionary zoning when arduous requirements 
for special use permits must first be met. Further, jurispruden-
136 See note 92 supra. 
137 Theoretically at least, one could bring a class action suit on behalf of mentally ill 
residents denied community residential placements in an area in general due to exclu-
sionary zoning; but see Warth, supra. note 103, requiring personal and immediate injury 
prior to suits challenging restrictive zoning practices. 
138 Presumably, judicial reform here to be truly effective must emanate from a 
state's highest court. It may also be that the legal structure of a state's authority to 
zone makes the uniform application of even a Supreme Court de,cision problematic. For 
example, zoning in Massachusetts has been (and perhaps still is) bifurcated, so that 
Boston and the rest of the state operate under separate bodie~ of statutory and case 
law. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A (West 1979). The same issue could arise where a 
'state has home rule and general law cities with disparate sources of zoning power. See 
note 89 supra and note 167 infra. 
139 See note 3 supra. For a journalist's description of the undesirable consequences 
of excessive concentrations of the mentally ill in a geographically confined area (not due 
to judicial action), see Koenig, The Problem That Can'tEe Tranquillized, N.Y. Times, 
May 21, 1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 14. 
140 See text accompanying notes 95 to 99 supra,' see note 138 supra. 
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tial considerations militate against predicating a legal solution 
on strained constructions of ordinances which themselves ad-
dress the controversy in an awkward fashion.141 
Finally, problems of implementation of judicial decrees in this 
area loom large. One could expect several undesirable conse-
quences to flow from the eradication of exclusionary zoning by 
judicial mandate without more, e.g., a glut of hastily conceived 
and executed programs, and defensive efforts by local govern-
ments or private neighborhood groups to devise alternative 
methods of exclusion.142 Courts attempting to block these 
results would find themselves serving as super-zoning boards, 
wasting scarce judicial resources while pursuing a legislative 
function. 143 
The risks in relying on judicial resolution of the exclusionary 
zoning dilemma are thus both practical and legal. And even if 
the problems are overcome once, they are still prone to repeti-
tion.144 As one scholar notes: "Adjudication through the courts 
is often costly in terms of both time and money. Furthermore, 
decisions in this novel and complex area are rarely so definitive 
and final that issues are settled permanently."1~5 
* * * 
The conflict over exclusionary zoning of the mentally ill is 
thus reflected in the struggle between the federal government, 
acting to return the mentally ill to life in the community, and 
local governments, acting to exclude the mentally ill. While re-
cent action by state judiciaries may be laudable and favorable to 
141 See Levey, supra note 110, for an apt criticism ofthe approach of eradicating ex-
clusionary zoning through a liberal construction of "family" on these grounds. See 
Zarek, for an example of the problem in the approach of deeming group residences 
educational uses. 
142 See note 88 supra. 
143 For critical commentary on the inefficacy and wastefulness of judicial reform in 
the zoning area, see the discussion of the activist New Jersey courts in the area of 
racially and economically exclusionary zoning in Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the 
Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of E'XClusionCLry Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 803 (1976). Equally instructive for the mentall)ealth realm is the series of opinions 
in Wyatt, note 78 supra. , 
144 For example, the authoritative opinion in White Plains, did not put an end to 
zoning dilemmas concerning group residences in New York, supra note 113. 
145 Cupaiolo, supra note 88, at 208. 
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the interests of the mentally ill, it cannot be relied upon for the 
ultimate resolution of the conflict here. 
In the words of one mental health professional: 
Although such policy issues are complex and not easily 
resolved, state legislation, nevertheless, appears to offer the 
best opportunity for guaranteeing the right of the mentally 
disabled to live in residential communities in the least 
restrictive setting possible. Such legislation would also be 
the most effective means of preventing excessive clustering 
of facilities that can unfavorably alter the character of a 
neighborhood to the detriment of all.146 
III. RESOLUTION: STATE LEGISLATION TO INTEGRATE THE 
MENTALLY ILL INTO COMMUNITY LIFE 
The solution of state legislation to prohibit exclusionary zon-
ing of group residences for the mentally ill has garnered sup-
port within the legal community as well as within the mental 
health system. The 1978 report of the President's Commission 
on Mental Health advocated "state zoning laws ... which 
preempt local zoning ordinances and permit small group homes 
for the mentally handicapped."147 Indeed, during the 1970's, 
sixteen state legislatures enacted statutes pertaining to zoning 
of group residences.148 Unfortunately, only a handful reached 
146 [d. at 210. 
147 TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 3, at 1388. 
148 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S§ 36-581 to 36-582 (Supp. 1979) (developmentally dis-
abled); CAL. WELF. & mST. CODE §§ 5115-5116 (Deering Supp. 1979) (mentally 
disordered, otherwise handicapped, dependent or neglected children); COLO. REV. STAT. 
S 31-23-303 (1977) (developmentally disabled); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59A, §§ 19A, 19B, 
20C (Supp. 1978) (mentally retarded); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 125.583b (Supp. 1980) 
(adults or children in general); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (Supp. 1978) (mentally 
retarded or physically handicapped); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. SS 11-2702.1 to .2 (Supp. 
1977) (developmentally disabled, handicapped, alcoholics and drug addicts, youths, 
adults in need of foster care); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. SS .40:55D-66 to 66.2 (West Supp. 
1980) (foster children, developmentally disabled, or mentally ill): N.M. STAT. ANN. 
S 3-21-1.C (1978) (mentally ill or developmentally disabled); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW S 
41.34 (Conso!.) (Supp. 1978) (1978) (mentally disabled); Omo REv. CODE ANN. S 5123.18 
(page) (Supp. 1977) (1977) (developmentally disabled); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 45-24-22 (Supp. 
1978) (mentally retarded); TENN. CoDE ANN. S5 13-2402 to 2404 (Supp. 1978) (mentally 
retarded or physically handicapped); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 S 4409(d) (Supp. 1979) 
(developmentally disabled or physically handicapped); VA. CODE S 15.10486.2 (Supp. 
1979) (mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled); WISC. STAT. S 60.74(a) 
(1977) (faster children and others). Other states have legislation which acknowledges 
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group residences for the mentally ill,149 thus rendering broad 
liberalization of zoning practices unlikely.150 It is timely, then, 
to consider the form future legislation should take.151 
The analysis presented here is not intended to suggest a 
model statute or even advocate features of universal ap-
propriateness. Diversity among the fifty states in terms of 
governmental structure,152 demographic patterns of the 
general population and the mentally ill,153 mental health 
delivery systems,154 socio-economic characteristics, and social 
philosophy, is significant and counsels against positing a model 
statute. Rather, the following is intended as a set of principles 
of wide applicability,155 a starting point for individual state 
the intersection of zoning and group residences without resolving the issue, e.g., N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-a:39 (Supp. 1977) or which one might argue applies to this con-
text, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 3 (West 1979). At least one state expressly 
has declared that group residences are to conform to local zoning. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 
15428:206 West (1978). 
149 Only five of the statutes by their terms or through liberal construction reach the 
mentally ill- California, Michigan, Montana, New York, Wisconsin. 
150 See analysis in text accompanying notes 200 to 226 infra. 
151 The analysis below should be of interest not only to state legislatures where laws 
covering zoning of group residences of any sort are lacking, but also to the legislatures 
of states whose laws do not encompass group residences for the mentally ill, since ex-
pansion of the current laws' coverage soon may be necessary. In terms of potential 
amendments to current provisions, the comments below should be considered even in 
those states where exclusionary zoning of the mentally ill has been treated in statutory 
law. 
152 For example, some states may need to deal with issues of home rule charters, 
supra note 89, or bifurcated zoning systems, supra note 138. 
153 The incidence of mental illness varies appreciably from state to state with the 
1973 average being one mental patient to 578 non-mentally ill citizens. FINANCING MEN· 
TAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 43, at 72. The incidence within a state, one might 
assume, would vary as well (e.g., between urban and residential areas). I question the ac-
curacy of this statement and how the author is defining "mentally ill." There seems to 
be some inconsistency in the way states are categorized as reaching the mentally ill or 
not. For example, Montana's statute applies to the "developmentally disabled" and is 
categorized as being one of the states with statutes reaching the mentally ill. However, 
Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Vermont, and Virginia statutes also 
apply to the "developmentally disabled," yet they are not categorized as reaching the 
mentally ill. Moreover, the New Jersey and New Mexico statutes specifically apply to 
the mentally ill but are not categorized as reaching the mentally ill. 
Maryland, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee statutes apply to the mentally 
retarded but are not categorized as reaching the mentally ill. Some clarification should 
be given. 
154 As of 1973, twenty-one states had independent mental health agencies. In the re-
mainder, mental health care was administered by state departments of health or social 
services or by hospitals or institutions. [d. at 74-75. 
155 To reiterate the caveat set forth in note 1 supra, the scope of this Note is con-
fined to group residences for the mentally ill. Some of what is said below may apply to 
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legislatures. The following analysis is designed to show that 
such legislation is valid under current law and to analyze that 
law critically in order to suggest improvements for future 
legislation. 
A. Validity of State Legislation Generally 
Because preemptive state legislation in the area of exclu-
sionary zoning is likely to require an alteration in a city's local 
land use,166 it, by definition, diminishes the scope of the local 
government's authority in determining certain land use ques-
tions in the future. 167 It is, therefore, only prudent to preface a 
proposal for such legislation with an assessment of the likely 
success of challenges to it based on allegations of unlawful 
tampering with the proper province of local governments. 
While the analysis here may be of only a very general nature in 
the absence of application of a specific state constitution or 
statute, the conclusion may be stated with some assurance: cur-
rent law indicates that, as a general matter, preemptive state 
legislation in the area of exclusionary zoning of group 
residences for the mentally ill would be held valid. 
To start, the courts have expressly affirmed zoning legislation 
in two of the 16 states with statewide zoning statutes. 1GB In 
passing on the validity of Montana's provision which.1iberalizes 
other group residence networks, but I make no pretentions that this is so. Of course, 
any legislation touching upon group residences for the mentally ill would do well to 
cover other group residence networks as well, since, from the land use perspective, the 
issues are inextricably linked. 
156 Restrictive local zoning ordinances and practices would be rendered invalid; even 
liberal zoning ordinances might be changed so as to reflect the scheme of inclusion re-
quired under the legislation. 
157 This assumes that the state's judiciary has not divested local authorities of their 
decisionmaking role here; few of the cases, if any, described in text accompanying notes 
110 to 132 supra can be described as doing so. 
158 Approval of the state legislation cited in note 148 supra, has been rendered in 
several state decisions which cite the laws and rely on them in finding for the group 
residence providers: Adams County, supra note 25; Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residen-
tial Systems Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978) (group residence for men-
tally retarded children and foster parents constituting a "family" held not barred by a 
private restrictive covenant allowing a single-family private dwelling only) [hereinafter 
cited as Bellarmine); TO'IJJnShip oj Washington, supra note 14; Berger, supra note 22; 
Y. W.C.A. ojSummit, supra note 24. Berger in particular echoes the analysis of Thelen, 
text accompanying note 160 infra, so that it may be read to create a strong implication 
of constitutionality. 
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zoning laws for a wide range of group residences,l59 that state's 
supreme court declared: 
While we recognize respondent city's arguments as to the 
desirability of maintaining local government control of zon-
ing regulations in its city, there is no question that the power 
of the legislature over the city in this matter is supreme. The 
legislature can give the cities of this state the power to 
regulate through zoning commissions, and the legislature 
can take it away .... 
Montana's legislature having determined that the constitu-
tional rights of the developmentally disabled to live and 
develop within our community structure as a family unit, 
rather than that they be segregated in isolated institutions, 
is paramount to the zoning regulations of any city, it 
becomes our duty to recognize and implement such 
legislative action.160 
The opinion underlines the two most direct and forceful 
grounds on which to hold legislation of this type constitutional 
in the face of challenges by local governments. To the extent 
that zoning power is delegated by state legislation (rather than 
inherent in local governmentsl6l), that power may be restricted 
by amendatory state legislation.162 And once such power is 
recognized, the policy of fulfilling the needs of disadvantaged or 
troubled citizens through community care may be given 
precedence over local zoning by the legislature.l6s 
Thus, in City of Los Angeles v. California Depart'J'YU3nt of 
Health,164 California legislation protecting a wide range of 
group residences from exclusion through zoning165 warded off 
159 See note 148 supra. 
160 Thelen, supra note 107, at 176-177. 
161 At least tliis is generally the case, see note 89 supra. See also text accompanying 
notes 164 to 168 infra. 
162 This principle is widely recognized in zoning law in general. ROHAN, supra note 
89, at § 35.02. 
163 See text accompanying notes 122 to 126 for instances of the judiciary's ranking 
of these two interests in case law absent statutory guidam~e. 
A starting point for analysis of what interests should prevail over conflicting zoning 
provisions is the test set forth in Payne, supra note 143, at 833: "Where local decision-
making under delega~d power would result in a signifi~t adverse impact upon an 
unrepresented interest or which, even absent such demonstrable impact, touches upon 
very important functions traditionally reserved for state decisionmaking, the delega-
tion [of zoning power] [should] be deemed unconstitutional." 
164 63 Cal. App. 3d, 473, 133 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1976) (no particular home at issue). 
165 See note 148 supra. 
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two challenges used frequently to attack this type of legislation. 
The court there rejected a claim that the legislation was fatally 
flawed due to overbreadth by noting that the appropriate stand-
ard for state legislation is not conservatism but constitutionali-
ty.166 More important, the court found the legislation valid as 
applied to "home rule" as well as general law cities167: 
If the scheme of regulation involved in the case at bench is 
treated as classical zoning, it then may well be a municipal 
affair subject to charter city ordinance which is inconsistent 
with state law. [citations omitted] If, however, the scheme is 
considered one relating to governing the location of homes 
for the placement of handicapped persons, then it relates to a 
matter of statewide concern. The consequences of place-
ment, treatment, and, hopefully, return of the handicapped 
to a productive and respected place in society is a subject 
that transcends municipal boundaries.16B 
City of Los Angeles thus again provides precedent for rejecting 
the arguments of overbreadth and "home rule" autonomy. The 
case provides support not only for the constitutionality of the 
laws but also for the proposition that they should be applied 
uniformly, local variations and political questions notwithstand-
ing. 
Case law authority from one state does not of course bind 
other states. However, there are still other means of precluding 
restrictive zoning. Legislation preempting restrictive zoning of 
group residences can be held valid under statutory exemptions 
in current zoning law or under the principle of sovereign im-
munity.169 By invoking immunity, litigants may indeed argue 
successfully that general public interest concerns outweigh the 
need for strict compliance with local regulations. 
166 133 Cal. Rptr. at 774. 
167 The crucial distinction between the two in this context is the disparity in sources 
of zoning authority. 
168 133 Cal. Rptr. at 774. 
169 There are of course differences between preemptive legislation on the one hand 
and exemption and sovereign immunity on the other, e.g., local ordinances which ex-
empt a use represent the volition of the local unit while preemptive state legislation 
represents pressure from a larger constituency; sovereign immunity as a judicial prod-
uct depends on factual situations as they arise, rather than pre-ordained results as 
legislation does. Exemptions mandated by state law closely approximate the approach 
of legislation in this context. These arguments are presented by way of analogy, not 
direct application. 
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Exemption from local zoning has already been afforded by 
legislatures at all levels. Some state zoning enabling acts delimit 
expressly the authority of local zoning bodies vis-a-vis certain 
activities.17o For example, the zoning enabling act for 
Massachusetts prohibits local zoning ordinances which regulate 
"the use of land or structures for religious purposes or for 
educational purposes" when owned by certain entities.171 Fur-
ther, some state zoning legislation contains more inclusive ex-
emption clauses, e.g., that governmental agencies or public uses 
may be exempted from local zoning upon determination by the 
appropriate state body.172 Exemptions include, at one end, 
federal or state statutes which explicitly or implicitly exempt 
certain government functions from local zoning ordinances173 
and, at the other end, local zoning ordinances which exempt 
municipal, governmental, or public uses.174 
In the absence of statutes providing for exemption or in the 
face of equivocal statutes, courts have found certain govern-
mental or public uses immune from zoning under the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.175 Courts in different jurisdictions faced 
with different contexts have developed several tests by which to 
determine whether a judicially-created exemption should be 
granted, e.g., superiority of government position, the govern-
mental vs. proprietary distinction, and the availability of emi-
nent domain.176 A recent trend has been the development of a 
less formalistic approach - the balance of interests test -
which asks courts to weigh "the nature and scope of the 
instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land 
use involved, the extent of the public interest to be served 
170 See R. ANDERSON & B. ROSWIG, PLANNING, ZONING & SUBDMSION: A SUMMARY OF 
STATUTORY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1966) for a state-by-state summary of uses af-
forded exemptions or favorable treatment in state zoning enabling acts. 
171 MAss. GEN. LAW STAT. ANN. ch. 40A, S 3 (West 1979). 
172 Id. See note 170 supra. 
1,?3 See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958); FREILICH, supra note 102. 
174 Annot., supra note 173. 
175 Id.,· ROHAN, supra note 89, at SS 35.07 and (VI) 40.03.2. This is to be distin-
guished from sovereign immunity from liability in tort afforded state officials by 
statute. 
176 These tests are summarized in Hillsborough, supra note 88. For a discussion of 
the various tests, see Note, Governmental Immunity jrom Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1971). 
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thereby, the effect local land use regulation would have upon 
the enterprise concerned, and the impact upon legitimate local 
interests." 177 
A survey of governmental entities typically held outside the 
reach of the local zoning body yields a wide range, from sewage 
treatment plants and turnpikes to multi-family housing projects 
and parks.178 Among the land use items often exempted from 
zoning restrictions completely or in part are schools179 and 
hospitals.180 
The favorable treatment afforded under present law to units 
such as hospitals and state office buildings argues for similar 
treatment of group residences for the mentally ill. In terms of 
environmental impact, e.g., consumption of space, size of struc-
ture, noise, fumes, and traffic, group residences are less objec-
tionable than the favored uses, since group residences by defini-
tion are in physical terms identical to the community's other 
homes. In terms of concerns ancillary to land use issues, such as 
peace and quiet and the tranquility of community residents, 
group residences should pose no greater threats than the 
favored uses. And group residences are equally deserving of 
relief from local regulation on the grounds that they perform an 
identifiable and valuable public function which extends beyond 
the local boundaries.18l 
Against this background of favorable case law and analogous 
authority, preemptive state zoning legislation benefitting group 
residences for the mentally ill should thv;s be deemed valid as an 
exercise of the various states' police power. 
B. The Existing Legislation 
The sixteen zoning statutes already in effect182 are far from 
177 Rutgers State University v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972). The 
Hillsborough court, supra note 88, is among those preferring this mode of analysis. 
178 R. ANDERSON, supra note 170; Annot., supra note 173. 
179 [d.; Annot., supra note 116. 
180 See note 178 supra; Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1022 (1969). 
181 See notes 4 to 41 supra. 
182 This discussion includes all sixteen of the acts cited in note 148 supra even 
though not all of them are on point in terms of client group. 
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identical; nonetheless, there is sufficient uniformity in their 
basic design and provisions to justify an overview.183 
Generally, the statutes serve as amendments to their state 
zoning enabling acts; alternatively, they are included in mental 
health or public welfare codes.184 Most of the statutes by their 
terms confine their reach to group homes serving only specified 
types of clients186 and to facilities housing no more than a 
specified number of residents (generally Six}.186 Others create 
several classes of group homes deserving different degrees of 
protection depending on the number187 or type188 of residents. 
Almost all of the statutes expressly limit their coverage to state-
licensed facilities.189 
Most of the statutes attempt to eradicate exclusionary zoning 
by process of definition, declaring that, for zoning purposes, 
group residences fitting the statutory definition are acceptable 
residential or single-family uses of property.190 Most of the 
statutes do not provide for different zoning treatment in more 
or less restrictive zones, although a few of the provisions do 
take cognizance of this factor .191 In most instances, the statutes 
impose one of several mechanisms by which the number and 
placement of the newly-defined residential uses within a city or 
town are to be controlled: dispersion limits (i.e., group 
183 For a schematic comparison of eleven of the acts (Arizona, Maryland, New York, 
Tennessee, Vermont excluded), see 3 AMICUS 2:38-39 (1978). 
184 The laws of Arizona, California, Maryland, New York and Ohio are found outside 
of the state zoning laws. 
185 See note 148 supra. 
186 See statutes in California, Colorado, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont, supra note 148. 
187 See statutes in Arizona, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin. The laws of Maryland, Mon-
tana and Virginia disregard the number of residents in a home, supra note 148. 
188 Legislatures in Colorado and Wisconsin have approached the problem in this 
way. See note 148 supra. 
189 The statutes of Montana, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Virginia fail to mention 
licensure. See note 148 supra. 
190 Exceptions are: New Jersey (bar on discrimination between children in the 
state's foster homes and biological families), Ohio (c~ homes are permitted uses), 
Virginia (local ordinances shall provide for these homes), Wisconsin (same as Ohio). See 
note 148 supra. 
191 Ohio and Wisconsin distinguish among different residential zones. The sixteen 
statutes essentially are uniform in focusing on residential zones and failing to mention 
zoning treatment of group residences elsewhere, except by implication (e.g., Virginia), 
note 148 supra. 
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residences must be a specified distance apart),192 density ceil-
ings (i.e., a group residence may be denied entry into a com-
munity if its presence would raise the percentage of group 
residence occupants in the community above a fixed number),193 
or the special use permit.194 The laws further allow localities to 
impose on group residences the safety and health restrictions 
applicable to similar structures.195 Several of the acts provide 
procedures involving prior notice to the affected community 
and a negotiation process196 or post-establishment community 
review.197 
Beyond the general description above, the acts vary widely, 
not only in terms of the relative complexity or apparent 
simplicity of their methods,198 but also in the strength of 
legislative conviction displayed by their language.199 
C. A Critique: Errors of the Past 
Ultimately, the strengths and weakness of the statutes 
already in existence (and of any future legislation) will be 
revealed in their results - how well they accommodate the 
often divergent desires of the mentally ill and the mentally 
stable. In the interim, analysis of the provisions yields several 
grounds for reservations as to their efficacy. 200 The root of most 
192 See statutes in Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Vermont, Wisconsin, 
note 148 supra. 
193 Wisconsin. See note 148 supra. 
194 The laws of Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio and Wisconsin give specific ap-
proval to special use permits. This issue is less than clear in most states. E.g., does the 
term "permitted" connote permitted as of right, or permitted by statutory grant only 
(which likely would entail a use permit)? 
195 Some statutes do not specify this per se, but inferring exemption from regula-
tions applicable to other family uses would be a difficult argument to maintain. 
196 See statutes in Arizona, Michigan, New York, Ohio, supra note 148. 
197 Wisconsin, supra note 148. 
198 Compare the Rhode Island statute with that of Wisconsin, supra note 148. 
199 Compare, e.g., the language of the New Jersey statute ("No zoning ordinance 
shall, by any of its provisions or by any regulations adopted in accordance 
therewith ... ") with that of the New Mexico statute (community residences "may be 
considered a residential use of property."), supra note 148. 
200 See ZONING FORCOMMUNITYHoMES:A HANDBOOK FOR LOCALLEGISLATlVE CHANGE 
(Law Reform Project, Developmental Disability Law, College of Law, Ohio State 
University 1975) for a proposal of local legislation similar to much of that currently in 
force. 
It should be noted at the outset that this analysis is not intended as a complete cri-
tique of anyone of the acts, but rather as a challenge to certain features shared by all or 
som~ of the acts. 
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of the flaws in the statutes enacted to date is the narrowness of 
their vision. Viewing the exclusionary zoning dilemma as mere-
ly a zoning issue,201 legislatures have provided solutions that 
operate within the strictures of zoning law and practices. In so 
doing, they have imported into their solutions the troublesome 
limitations of zoning itself: undue reliance on problematic 
definitions which may be re-worked to accomplish the forbidden 
end under a different guise; a substructure of regulations which 
also may accomplish what zoning itself may not do; and 
mechanistic approaches to allocational issues where case-by-
case analysis is indicated.202 
What is perhaps most striking about the approach of the pres-
ent legislation is the uniformity of its method. While there is lit-
tle reason to quarrel with the labeling of "group residences" as 
single family residential uses,203 the approach itself is seriously 
flawed. "Residential use" does not uniformly appear in all zon-
ing legislation204; nor does the term "residential use" denote a 
priori a use free from zoning restrictions. That is, residential 
uses themselves may be barred from areas where one may wish 
to establish a group residence.205 Similarly, definitions of 
residential uses currently in local ordinances do not necessarily 
contemplate a structure that could feasibly be used for a group 
house residence program. Wealthy communities may attach 
restrictions on the term, such as set-back or acreage re-
quirements, which make it economically impossible to establish 
a group residence under a qualifying residential use. Most of the 
statutes apparently would not disturb this situation.206 
Furthermore, because local zoning authorities may construe 
the residential use definition as they see fit, the opportunity for 
communities to bar group residences through zoning 
201 See note 184 supra. 
202 See note 190 supra. 
203 The little reason that does exist would be that group residences are more than 
mere residences; they also are treatment modalities. See note 14 supra. 
204 Admittedly, the term "residential" would seem to be one of wide usage, but 
whether it is of universal usage is doubtful. 
205 It is more likely than not, however, that a group residence provider would prefer 
an area with other homes; yet economic forces, past land use patterns, etc., might com-
bine to make a site in, for example, a light commercial zone appropriate. 
206 See note 195, supra. Countenancing the application of separate local rules 
regarding safety, building specifications, etc., probably reflects implicit approval of 
restrictions in the zoning definitions themselves. 
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remains.207 For example, the statutes do not by their terms 
preclude local zoning bodies from evading the impact of the 
legislation by eliminating the term from their ordinances 
altogether, by attaching (or retaining) prohibitive qualifications 
to the term, or by devising other terms to cover preferred uses 
(such as normal private homes) in order to exclude "residential 
uses" from the category.208 Thus, reliance on the simple ter-
minology of statutes is undesirable since legal definitions may 
be construed to reach an end not comtemplated by the defini-
tion itself. 
Second, devising a solution that operates within the zoning 
system retains the very procedures which in practice may 
diminish the impact of the legislation's apparent reform. In par-
ticular, the majority of the sixteen provisions already enacted 
expressly provide or imply that local zoning authorities may re-
quire group residences to acquire special use permits.209 As 
noted above, the special use permit has been recognized under 
present zoning law as an effective means of excluding an 
undesired use.210 The specific approval of the device by the state 
legislature might be viewed by local zoning authorities as 
justification for employing it frequently and rigorously to ex-
clude group residences. In addition, some of the legislation as 
applied could still require a prospective group residence pro-
vider to apply for a variance or continuation of a non-
conforming use.211 These application procedures thus tend to be 
207 See DeveWpments - Zoning, supra note 38, at 1624-1708. k.t. Laurel, supra 
note 104, is the landmark case in the area of economically exclusionary zoning. The 
issue most often arises when the exclusion operates to the detriment of racial 
minorities. One could argue, however, that the practice is even less defensible when it 
disadvantages the mentally ill, whose particular problems entail not only discrimination 
of a general nature, but also specific clinical and functional needs. 
208 Admittedly, such approaches are prone to attack as relying to an impermissible 
extent on the terms while evading the spirit of the legislation. Yet conceivably a strict 
constructionist court might be convinced that a specific statute was meant only as a 
definitional guide and not as an enactment infused with a public purpose, particularly in 
the absence of clearly expressed legislative intent. ' 
209 See note 194 supra. 
210 See note 98 supra. 
211 This can occur when the site of the residence is in a nonresidential area in which 
residential uses are conditional; where statutory language deeming group residences to 
be permitted residential uses is construed to require prior zoning board approval of such 
residences; or, where the structure to be used was previously nonconforming. 
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weighted against the applicant whose use is unpopular by 
vesting the decisionmaking authority in the zoning board (com-
posed of community members) and by allowing opponents of the 
use to register their views without attempting to measure 
whether the expressed views are representative of the com-
munity consensus.212 Thus, the burden of implementing the ap-
parent reform instituted by the statutes may well fall on the 
group residence provider by virtue of zoning's procedural 
obstacles. And that burden may be a heavy one. 
A third, related flaw in the current legislation is that, along 
with the definitional restrictions and procedural burdens of zon-
ing itself, comes a substructure of ancillary regulations. Thus, 
the group residence that gains entry to a neighborhood through 
liberalization of a community's zoning ordinances would be sub-
jected to its safety and health regulations, its building code, 
etc.213 While compliance with these rules probably would be in 
the best interests of the residents and the community, it is 
possible that the rules could be unduly stringent or inapposite to 
the group residence context.214 Another potential cause for con-
cern is possible abuse of the inspection procedures,2,16 since the 
enforcement of local health and building codes is a government-
al function of comparatively low visibility, and attendantly low 
public accountability. 
Fourth, most of the statutes contain provisions aimed at 
regulating the distribution of group residences among and 
within the states' communities. Because the thrust of the 
legislation is to resolve future particular cases with a single a 
priori rule, they resort to numerical s~hemes - the density and 
dispersion limits.216 Both of these schemes are questionable, not 
only in terms of the numbers chosen, but also in terms of the 
legal theories underlying them and their probable practical con-
sequences. The density limit relies on a notion that has earned 
212 For a general discussion of zoning and procedural due process, see Developments 
- Zoning, supra, note 38, at 1502-550. ~ 
213 See note 195 supra. 
214 This is most likely to be a problem in wealthy areas where community residential 
standards would exceed the means of a group residence program. 
215 See Aviram, supra note 29, for a description of the problem from the mental 
health professional's perspective. 
216 See notes 192 and 193 supra. 
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increasing support among some legal theoreticians - that cer-
tain public services should be allocated among and responsibil-
ity assumed by communities according to their fair share of a 
region's needs.217 According to this theory, one could argue 
that it is defensible to set a ceiling on the percentage of a city's 
population composed of persons residing in group residences, so 
long as the figure corresponds to the percentage of persons 
needing residential placement services.218 The' 'fair share" doc-
trine expounded by the New Jersey Supreme Court arguably 
allows such an allocation. Thus far, however, the doctrine has 
been construed to require communities to ease their restrictive 
land use policies, not make them more restrictive.219 Extending 
the doctrine to support the density control scheme here thus 
would abort its rationale. 
Similarly, the dispersion limit is designed to allow a communi-
ty to mitigate the potentially undesirable consequences of a par-
ticular land use by dispersing incidences of the use, thereby 
dissipating their aggregate impact. The principle has been 
declared constitutiQnally sound - in the context of porno-
graphic theaters.220 However salient differences between 
pornographic theaters and group residences for the mentally ill 
- e.g., the former exists primarily for private enjoyment while 
the latter serves an important public welfare function - make 
invocation of this "precedent" highly questionable. 
The practical wisdom of the dispersion and density devices is 
also far from clear. Both devices are designed to restrict the 
number and location of group residences within a distinct 
geographical area by imposing an arbitrary ceiling, a ceiling 
which predicates the permissibility of a new program on the 
217 A seminal article in advocating a regional approach to determining land·use 
issues involving public services is Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Plan-
ning, 105 U. PENN. L. REV. 515 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Haar]. The leading case 
authority for the notion is Mt. Laurel, supra note 104. Cj. Toumship of Washington, 
supra note 14, in which the court discounts Mt. Laurel as requiring assumption of 
responsibility for group residences on a regional basis. 
218 Calculating the percentage would be difficult as a practical matter and raises 
numerous questions: Should the figure be calculated on a regional basis, or statewide? 
How often should it be updated? Should it distinguish among different group residence 
client groups? 
219 Cj. Toumship of Washington, supra note 14; see Developments - Zoning, supra 
note 38, at 1624-1708. 
220 Young v. American Mini·Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
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number and location of programs already established. The 
mechanisms thus prefer early-comers over late-co~rs without 
regard to the comparative qualities of their programs. Both 
schemes ignore the disparities among geographical areas and 
even neighborhoods in terms of socio-economic and physical 
characteristics, not to mention, incidence of mental illness221 -
the factors that should and do determine the appropriateness of 
a group residence site. Numerous undesirable results could flow 
from reliance on such schemes: a large region could lack a group 
residence altogether because all of the towns would be small 
enough to claim the density exemption; the benefits of 
geographical proximity could be denied a consortium of com-
mendable programs by the dispersion provision; and an urban 
area could be seriously underserved because the small sector 
where group residences feasibly could be located is already full. 
The schemes thus suffer from the inherent weakness of all 
numerical cut-off schemes: regulating quantity is a poor means 
of assuring quality. 
The statutes already enacted not only bring with them the 
problems endemic to zoning as a legal construct, but also the 
pressing concerns ignored by zoning. These concerns are both 
legal and factual. 
Zoning alone does not constitute the entire legal system 
governing land use. As previously discussed, legal constructs ,. 
such as sovereign immunity and second-level local regulations 
like building codes, also determine the use to which a piece of 
property may and probably will be put. Two legal instruments 
also remain by which private parties may affect the course of 
someone else's enjoyment of property - the tort action of 
nuisance and restrictive deeds and covenants. Both of these 
have been used to challenge group residences, with mixed suc-
cess.222 The speculative nature of a nuisance challenge to a pro-
posed group residence renders such a suit a relatively minor 
obstacle to the establishment of group residences.223 By con-
221 See note 153 supra. 
222 See notes 223 and 224 infra. 
223 In Nicholson, supra note 37, Connecticut's Supreme Court refused an injunction 
against the future operations of a halfway house for parolees on the grounds that fears 
regarding community disruption and lowered property values were too speculative. See 
also Hillsborough, supra note 88. 
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trast, courts have been receptive to assertions that restrictive 
zoning covenants are legally (if not practically) consistent with 
stateWide legislation and have excluded group residences under 
that rationale.224 Thus, even if the sixteen statutes discussed 
here could be said to solve conclusively the zoning dilemma, the 
broader and ultimate issue of whether a community lawfully 
may exclude a group residence could persist. 
Finally, zoning by definition addresses only the land use 
ramifications of multifaceted social and political conflicts. Yet 
in the context of group residences for the mentally ill, numerous 
other obstacles operate simultaneously, e.g., non-existent public 
education programs, incomplete supportive services 
networks,225 and inadequate funding.226 Thus, as an ultimate 
solution to zoning rules excluding the mentally ill, current 
legislation is a shortsighted response. 
D. A Critique: Suggestions for Future Laws 
As discussed above, the failings in present state legislation 
aimed at prohibiting exclusionary zoning of group residences 
derive from the narrowness of the legislation's operating 
premise - that exclusionary zoning is primarily a zoning prob-
lem. These failings could be remedied in large part by abandon-
ing that premise in favor of a broader perspective - that exclu-
sionary zoning is a multifaceted dilemma of exclusion, of which 
zoning is only the most easily idep.tifiable part. A shift in 
premises calls for a shift in the approach of the legal solution. 
The following are very general suggestions :concerning prin-
ciples and mechanisms for future legislation in keeping with the 
broad view that the real problem here extends beyond the zon-
ing arena.227 
224 In Seaton, supra note 88, California's legislation overruling exclusionary zoning 
practices was held not to bar enforcement of restrictive prh(ate covenants, while in 
Bellarmine, supra note 158, Michigan's legislation was held to bar enforcement of the 
same. See also Berger, supra note 22, which avoids the issue. 
225 See Part I of this Note for a discussion of the importance of public education and 
support services to the success of a group residence. 
226 See RETURNlNG THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 6; Jacobs, A Hard Look: 
Seeking the Best Care/or the Mentally Ill, San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 26,1979, p.1 
(describing the difficulties in the California mental health services network even after 
the liberalization of zoning laws, due to insufficient funding). 
227 Several of the suggestions here are incorporated in some of the present legisla· 
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First, to the extent that some of the difficulties in the present 
legislation (awkward and malleable definitions, procedures 
capable of skewing the legislation's intent, arbitrary allocation 
schemes, etc.) are endemic to zoning, the appropriate remedy is 
to circumvent completely the zoning structure. Thus, rather 
than defining the status as assigned group residences in local 
zoning ordinances, state legislation should remove group 
residences from the province of local zoning and zoning-related 
authorities altogether.228 Extensive legal precedent supports 
the exemption of public uses from zoning.229 And so long as an 
alternative system to regulate the establishment and operation 
of the homes replaces the imperfect control mechanism present-
ly afforded by zoning, no practical deleterious consequences 
should result. 
Second, the task of determining the placement of group 
residences in order to produce a mental health services network 
responsive to the needs of the state's mentally ill and mentally 
stable citizens should be vested in a state agency.230 Exclu-
sionary zoning of group residences poses a dilemma for the 
legal system in part because of the "lack of correspondence be-
tween the political boundary (of the decisionmaking govern-
ment) and the functional problem."231 Assigning ultimate 
authority and responsibility for a state-level problem232 to a 
state-level agency could correct the incongruity. One could ex-
pect the consolidation of responsibility in one agency to 
heighten the sense of organization and expertise in the decision-
making body. In particular, the assumption of responsibility by 
tion; where this is so, the notes cite the state. None of the present statutes, however, 
could be said to follow the pattern suggested here as a whole. 
228 The Maryland and Ohio statutes appear at first glance to take this approach. 
Whether they really do is doubtful. 
229 See notes 170 to 174 supra. 
230 The New York and Ohio statutes provide for a role for the state's departments of 
mental health in the placement of group residence~; whether the state agency or the 
local body has the first or final say is not clear. 
Whether the most appropriate agency for the task here is the mental health depart-
ment is open to serious doubt.c One would prefer an agency whose expertise incor-
porates more than mental health issues, e.g., an agency charged only with locating 
group residences. 
231 Haar, supra note 217, at 515. 
232 See note 43 supra. 
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a state agency could ease the confusion and imbalance now 
evidenced by exclusionary zoning by providing: a statewide 
plan, uniform standards for group residences, and procedures 
governing the establishment and continued operations of group 
residences. 
First, the involvement of a state agency would no doubt even-
tuate in statewide coordination; with such a scheme, group 
residences could be apportioned according. to assessments of 
current and future regional mental health needs and community 
development patterns. As a pragmatic matter, the development 
and implementation of such a plan would assure the state's 
eligibility for federal financial assistance where grants are 
awarded according to the efforts of the state.233 Furthermore, 
one would expect that a group residence network established 
pursuant to a statewide plan would better serve a state's 
citizenry than a network established haphazardly. In terms of 
land use, the institution of a state plan would serve the func-
tional role of zoning, since it would establish its own set of ex-
pectations with regard to property use.234 
Second, the involvement of a state agency charged with 
locating and regulating group residences would lead to the 
development of appropriate and comprehensive standards for 
group residences. Vesting the responsibility for defining the 
status of group residences in a state agency would at the very 
least demand a conscious policy and obviate the piecemeal ap-
proach of previous state endeavors. State licensure systems for 
group residences exist already235; expanding the licensure 
system to include land use criteria would complement that proc-
ess. Of course, local variations in land use and community 
characteristics would be a key variable in the application of any 
standards. A comprehensive and cohesive set of standards, 
which include consideration of local peculiarities, should result 
in a system of group residences that meet not only the needs of 
the residents but also the concerns of neighborhoods.286 
233 See text accompanying notes 45 to 67. 
234 Developments - Zoning, supra note 38. 
235 For a description and analysis of a state's licensure provisions, see Plonavich, 
Washington's Adult (}roup Home Regulations, 13 GONZAGA L. REV. 813 (1978). 
236 See Part I of this Note. 
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Third, implementation of a state plan and enforcement of the 
standards for group residences would necessitate a comprehen-
sive Study of the competing interests of neighborhoods and 
group residents. As described above,237 the decision to permit a 
particular residence (both with and without preemptive state 
legislation) often is made first by local officials who are 
pressured by community groups or by private citizens. Given 
the public needs met by group residences,238 this localized focus 
appears inappropriate; the procedural safeguards afforded by a 
state's administrative procedure act239 yvould probably produce 
more equitable results. Further, the case-by-case analysis af-
forded by a license system could produce more refined results 
than the quota devices in current legislation.24o A systematic 
approach to allocating community residences would necessitate 
solicitation of views of the general public and thus potentially 
educate the community and still some of the unfounded fears.241 
A system of state planning and licensure exempting group 
residences from regulation, however, would be as ineffective as 
the legislation already in force, in the absence of provisions 
dealing with nuisance suits and private restrictive convenants. 
While it may be unnecessary to bar nuisance challenges 
altogether, legislation could attempt to mitigate their del-
eterious consequences by providing for state defense of the suit 
if the residence complies with the state's standards, creating a 
presumption in favor of the residence under the same cir-
cumstances, or devising a mechanism in the licensure applica-
tion and renewal process which would afford the commu-
nity a structured opportunity to express its views.242 The threat 
posed by private restrictive covenants and deeds may also war-
rant some legislative action.243 
237 See text accompanying notes 98, 209 to 215, 222 to 224. 
238 See text accompanying notes 7 to 18 supra. 
239 State administrative procedure acts vary somewhat; for a general impression, 
see UNIFORM LAW CmmflSSIONERS' REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
Acr (1946, as amended 1958). 
240 See text following note 219 supra. 
241 See text accompanying notes 30 to 32 supra explaining why education of the 
public is so crucial here. 
242 This has been done in Wisconsin, see note 148 supra. 
243 See Arizona statutes, note 148 supra. 
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Finally, legislation purporting to eradicate exclusionary zon-
ing of group residences for the mentally ill wi1J. involve novel 
areas of law244 and controversial aspects of American society. 
To forestall limiting constructions of legislation, lawmakers 
would do well to state their intentions clearly. Of course, the 
strength of a legislature's commitment to the integration of the 
mentally ill into community life is most forcefulJy evidenced by 
complementary legislation providing funding. Regardless of 
whether such accompanying legislation exists, legislatures must 
spell out their intent to prohibit exclusionary zoning, as in the 
following California provision: "The Legislature hereby finds 
and declares: (a) It is the policy of this state ... that mentally 
and physically handicapped persons are entitled to live in nor-
mal residential surroundings and should not be excluded there-
from because of their disability."245 
Conclusion 
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court held that zoning 
may be used to create residential neighborhoods where "family 
values ... and the blessings of quiet seclusion ... make the 
area a sanctuary for people"246 The federally-sponsored 
deinstitutionalization movement of the past fifteen years has 
sought to find a place-·in residential communities for the mental-
ly ill who are capable of leading relatively independent lives. 
Yet, the beneficiaries of "quiet seclusion" have sought to use 
zoning to exclude the mentally ill from their sanctuaries. 
The burden of reconciling the needs of the mentally ill as 
recognized by the federal government and the self-protectionist 
concerns and defense mechanisms of communities and local 
governments lies with the states. Since efforts by state 
judiciaries are inadequate to the task, state legislation is 
necessary. In particular, preemptive state legislation which 
would exempt group residences for the mentally ill from regula-
tion by zoning authorities and institute an alternative com-
244 See generally MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER, supra note 1, and 
Developments - Zoning, supra note 38, for a sense of the rapid change in mental health 
and zoning laws. 
245 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5115 (Deering Supp. 1979). 
246 Belle Terre, supra note 106, at 9. 
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prehensive state-level planning and licensure system commends 
itself as a potential method of reform. 
To resolve the conflicts underlying exclusionary zoning of the 
mentally ill, legislatures must recognize that the root conflict is 
a social one: a struggle between groups, which, as one scholar 
notes, view themselves as distinct, whether they are or not: 
"Physical inclusion in a community is not enough; social inclu-
sion, a willingness among community members to allow a de-
crease in their social distance from the rpentally ill living among 
them, is necessary for true integration:"247 
247 LMm. supra note 12, at 53. 
